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PHILOSOPHY OF GAUḌAPĀDA (ALĀTAŚĀNTI-PRAKARAṆAṀ)

By JNANENDRALAL MAJUMDAR

INTRODUCTION

THE position of Gauḍapāda in the history of Hindu Philosophy is unique. So far as the extant literature goes, he was the first to make an effort to explain the Śruti from the standpoint of absolute monism which means, in short, that there is an eternal principle of absolute homogeneity which is truly existent while the world of multiplicity is truly non-existent. This standpoint he has set forth in a metrical treatise of four chapters, called Prakaraṇas, subjoined to the *Māṇḍūkya* Upaniṣad, the smallest of the ten principal Upaniṣads. It was undoubtedly this treatise which gave Śaṅkara the inspiration to explain all the ten Upaniṣads in the same light, for he was not able to quote any other exposition of the Śruti in support of his view and himself wrote a commentary on it. Indeed, Śaṅkara was a disciple of Govindapāda who was in the line of disciples of Gauḍapāda.

Absolute monism one may deduce from the Śruti when one has got an idea of it from somewhere else, but the Śruti nowhere states it in its fullness. The truth of the one universal principle called Brahma is, no doubt,

the theme of the ten Upaniṣads, but they nowhere posit that the world which evolves in it is false in the sense of being non-existent. To say, as Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara have said, that true monism cannot rationally stand unless the world is considered really nonexistent and so the Śruti teaches absolute monism, is to beg the question, for here you first depend on a particular form of reasoning to get the idea of absolute monism and then impose it on the Śruti. All previous commentaries on the Śruti have been lost except the *Brahmasūtra*. Our present knowledge about them is limited to Śaṅkara's stray references to them. The ancient commentary, called the *Vṛtti*, on the *Brahmasūtra* is also lost and here also we have to depend on Śaṅkara's references to it for knowing its purport. None of these commentaries maintained that the Śruti or the *Brahmasūtra* taught absolute monism. And since the advent of Śaṅkara great Hindu teachers have firmly declared that absolute monism, however logical it might be, is not warranted by the Sruti. The Śruti nowhere states that the world is non-existent, unborn, like a flower in the sky or a city of the Gandharvas, a dream, a māyā.

But this is the proposition which Gauḍapāda seeks to establish in every one of the Prakaraṇas or chapters of his book. In the 17th Kārikā or verse of the 1st Prakaraṇa, the only chapter which deals directly with the contents of the *Māṇḍūkya* Upaniṣad, he says, "This dual world is nothing but a Māyā." In the 31st verse of the 2nd Prakaraṇa, in which the unreality of the world is ought to be established on a consideration of the dreaming state, he says, "As a dream and a Māyā are seen, as a city of the Gandharvas is seen, so is the world seen by those who are proficient in the Vedāntas." At the outset (verse 2) of the 3rd Prakaraṇa he clearly states his proposition. "I shall establish unlimited, universal Ajāti (non-birth), how the things which are seen to be born on all sides are not

born." In verse 23 of the same Prakaraṇa he says that he will depend on reasoning in the proving of this proposition. "The Śruti speaks of creation equally from the born and from the unborn. What is undoubtedly in accordance with reasoning, that is the fact and nothing else." This 3rd Prakaraṇa he devotes mainly to the consideration of a number of passages from the Upaniṣads, seeking therefrom to establish that the Śruti teaches an ultimate monistic principle and non-birth of the world. These three chapters together comprise 115 verses.

The elaborate reasoning by which the proposition of non-birth is to be proved is reserved for the 4th Prakaraṇa a chapter containing 100 verses, that is, almost as big as the three previous chapters taken together. In it are included some of the verses on dream of the 2nd Prakaraṇa and, with slight variations, some verses of the 1st and 3rd Prakaraṇas. It is called *Alātaśāntiprakaraṇa*, that is the chapter on the quietude of the fire-brand, the meaning of which will come out in the course of the exposition of the contents of the chapter by Satyananda, the commentator. The chapter begins with an enunciation of the principle of absolute monism in five verses and the rest of it is devoted to the proof of the proposition thus enunciated.

The most important question for consideration here is, whence did Gauḍapāda get the idea of the nonbirth of the world if he did not get it from the Śruti? In verse 31 of the 2nd chapter, which has been quoted before, he himself says that this idea was held by wise men "proficient in the Vedāntas," and so he was not its originator. Now, who were these wise men if they were not the orthodox commentators of the Vedāntas and the *Brahmasūtra*? It may sound strange at present to announce that these wise men were the Buddha and his followers, for since the disappearance of Buddhism and Buddhist literature from India we have been persistently taught by all the writers

on Hindu Philosophy, great and small, that the Buddha was a great renegade who had absolutely no faith in the teaching of the Śruti and considered the world to be merely a flux of mentation with no abiding principle underlying it, and that his followers gradually ended by proclaiming a theory of absolute nihilism which gave denial not only to an ultimate reality but also to the perception of the world. And this culminating madness the Hindu writers ascribed to the great Nāgārjuna, who is supposed to be the founder of the Mādhyamika school of Buddhism, and preached the doctrine of Śūnya or Emptiness which he has learnt from the Mahāyāna scriptures, the principal of which is the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, and from his great predecessors such as Aśvaghoṣa. But the days were different when Gauḍapāda lived probably in the 3rd or 4th century A. D. within about two centuries from the time of Nāgārjuna. Then certainly the Mahāyāna was a power in the land and great teachers were not ashamed to call themselves followers of the Buddha and Vendāntists at the same time, just as people at present are not ashamed to call themselves followers of Śaṅkara or Rāmānuja and Vedāntists at the same time, and Gauḍapāda was one of them. He had no scruple in accepting the Brahmavāda of Yājñavalkya and other Śrauta ṛṣis, supplementing it with the Ajātivāda of the Buddha and his followers and finishing with full-fledged absolute Advaitavāda as is laid down in the Mahāyāna scripture, the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, and this was exactly what he did. He took for his text the shortest Upaniṣad in which the ultimate Brahma-principle is clearly set forth without any admixture of talks about creation, proceeded in the first three chapters to elucidate the Brahma-principle from the standpoint of Ajātivāda quoting the Śruti and Nāgārjuna in the same breath and finished in the last chapter with a systematic summary of the *Mahāyāna-Sūtra*. In this summary we find all the details of the theory and exposition of absolute

monism contained in the voluminous Sūtra presented within a short compass, remarkably well arranged and retaining all the technicalities of the Sūtra in expression and diction. Noble indeed was the effort of Gauḍapāda and other Vedāntists to bridge the gulf between the Ārya-jñāna of orthodox Brāhmaṇas and the Ārya-jñāna of Buddhist reformers, and so tremendously successful was it that even when the name of the Buddha was on anathema, Śaṅkara, while he was leading the attack against Buddhism with his giant intellect and unflinching enrgy was unwittingly preaching the Mahāyāna and preserving and elucidating its essence in his immortal commentaries. And for all this we are indebted solely to Gauḍapāda, for Śaṅkara, though he never dreamt that absolute monism was Mahāyāna Buddhism, preached it on his authority. Now, that we have the Buddhist texts discovered in foreign lands, it seems strange to us that, coming only about three hundred years after Gauḍapāda, Śaṅkara was not struck by the peculiarly un-śrauta character of his terminology. The result was that the terms of the Mahāyāna used by Gauḍa-pāda were misinterpreted. Gauḍapāda himself was presented as an anti-Buddhist and his references to the Buddha were considered as references to anti-Buddhist wise men (the word *buddha* literally means the wise man). It was only in the last but one verse that the term Buddha could by no means be interpreted as a mere wise man, but here also by the displacement of a *na*(no), Śaṅkara denied to the Buddha the paramount teaching which was his and his only. But in spite of all these vital defects in Śaṅkara's understanding of Gauḍapāda, he caught from him the principle of absolute monism, stuck to it and brought to bear such a fund of erudition and reasoning on it as has ever been the wonder of learned men.

We shall present the reader with a skeleton of Mahāyāna technology to enable him to see how closely Gauḍa-

pāda has followed it. The references to verse are to Kārikās of *alātaśāntiprakaraṇa*.

COSMOLOGY

1. *Samvṛti* and *Paramārtha*

Existence, reality (sattā) or truth (satya), which terms are almost synonymous from the philosophical standpoint, is two-fold, namely, Samvṛti and Paramārtha. Samvṛti means convention or usage,and Paramārtha means highest reality or ultimate reality. The truth of convention underlies the world which is really unreal, while the truth of ultimate reality is the ever-abiding truth or reality.

Verses 57, 73 and 74 deal with Samvṛti and Paramārtha.

2. *Parikalpita*, *Paratantra* and *Pariniṣpaṇṇa* svabhāvas

Existence is further subdivided, according to svabhāva or nature, into Parikalpita (imaginary), Paratantra (mutually dependent or relative) and Pariniṣpaṇṇa (absolute). These are the three svabhāvas of the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*. The Parikalpita-svabhāva is the imaginary nature of illusions like a mirage and a flower in the sky. The Paratantra svabhāva is the relative or mutually dependent nature of the practical world where all things are mutually dependent, nothing exists independently of all other things. The Pariniṣpaṇṇa svabhāva is the absolute nature of the ultimate reality which is neither Parikalpita nor Paratantra, Parikalpita, or merely, Kalpita, and Paratantra are subdivisions of samvṛti, while Pariniṣpaṇṇa is the same as Paramārtha which term is retained by Gauḍapāda in his delineation of the three svabhāvaṣ.

Verse 24 speaks of paratantra existence, and verses 73 and 74 speak of all the three forms of existence.

"Let the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva," said the Buddha, "be well acquainted with the three kinds of svabhāva."[1]

3 *Five Dharmas*

Existence, subdivided into the three svabhāvas, is still further subdivided into five Dharmas or characteristic types. They are :—Nimitta (form), Nāma (name), Vikalpa (discrimination), Samyag-jñāna (right knowledge) and Tathatā (suchness).

Nimitta (form)—The word means cause and here signifies the world which binds a being to saṁsāra through attachment to it. Rūpa is another word for nimitta which is translated into form or appearance meaning "that which reveals itself to the visual sense and is perceived as form, and, in like manner, that which appearing to the sense of hearing, smelling, tasting, the body or the Manovijñāna is perceived as sound, odour, taste, tactibility or idea."[2]

It is an inner or outer object perceived by the mind alone or through any of the external senses. Or, better, it is a sensual or mental image which is called an object.

Nāma (name)—A name is not merely the sound that is heard when it is uttered. As the sound it is a nimitta, a form, an appearance, an object of hearing. But the real significance of a name lies in its intimate connection with the object which it denotes as well as connotes. In merely denoting it points to an object and in connoting it referes to the class and individual marks of the object which combine to pick it out from other objects. A name is thus descriptive serving to draw the attention of the person to whom it is spoken to the object which it describes. If a dog is called Caesar, the term is not merely a sound-form but is also descriptive of the significant general characteristics of the dog-class and of the special individual characteris-

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[1] *Laṅkāvatāra-Sūtra*, xxiii.

[2] *L. Sūtra*, Lxxxiii.

tics of the particular dog-object; otherwise, it would not refer to a dog and the particular dog. As a *nimitta* is a sensual or mental image, so a *nāma* is a description in particular reference to it. Thus a *nimitta* and its *nāma* are inseparably bound together. Both rise together and fall together.

Vikalpa (discrimination)—"By 'discrimination' is meant that by which names are declared, and there is thus the indicating of (various) appearances. Saying that this is such and no other, for instance, saying that this is an elephant, a horse, a woman or a man, each idea thus discriminated is so determined."[3] Discrimination is that faculty of the mind which recognises or imagines distinguishing characteristic marks in objects and thus assigns names to them. It is what makes a being live in a world of *nimitta* and *nāma*. The basic distinction underlying a person's worldly existence is that between himself the cogniser and his cognised world, the subject and the object, and on it depend all other distinctions, namely, those existing between the cognised objects. Hence discrimination is mainly concerned with the distinction between the subject and the object.

These three Dharmas, namely, Nimitta, Nāma and Vikalpa, constitute the Parikalpita and Paratantra svabhāvas of existence, the unreal reality, the saṃvṛti.

Samyagjñāna (right knowledge)—"By 'right knowledge' is meant this: when names and appearances are seen as unattainable owing to their mutual conditioning, there is no more rising of the Vijñānas, for nothing comes to annihilation, nothing abides everlastingly; and when there is no more falling back into the stage of the philosophers, Śrāvakas and Pratyeka-buddhas, it is said that there is right knowledge."[4] Right knowledge is where there

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[3] L. *Sūtra*, Lxxxiii.

[4] L. *Sūtra*, Lxxxiii

is no thought of the reality of the phenomenal world of name and form, and no discrimination of subject and object. It is knowledge in perfection, pure, eternal and universal. It is unattainable but is revealed when the Manovijñāna is destroyed by a thorough understanding of the unreality of the world. When it is revealed, the true existence, which is Tathatā, is revealed, for it is one with it.

Samyag-jñāna which is knowledge itself is also samyak-sattā, that is, Existence itself to which Tathatā (Suchness) and other names are given according to different characters attributed to it.

Tathatā (Suchness)—"When erroneous views based on the dualistic notion of assertion and negation are got rid of, and when the Vijñānas cease to rise as regards the objective world of names and appearances this I call 'Suchness,' Mahāmati, a Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva who is established on Suchness attains the state of imagelessness."[5] Tathatā or Suchness is the unchanging, eternal infinite, homogeneous monistic principle which alone exists and nothing else. As such it is undefinable and is hence called Suchness, that is, Such-as-it-is. Every definition must perforce contain a statement of the characteristics of the object defined. But the Ultimate is characterless and so cannot be defined. Our language is, moreover, limited to the limitations of our sense-perception and so always dualistic, and cannot, therefore, exactly define the unlimited. Even such terms as eternal, infinite, homogeneous, monistic and unborn do not correctly define the Reality, for they are all terms of dualism, dichotomous, eternality refers to non-eternality, infinity refers to finiteness and so forth; but the Reality has nothing to do with the dualism of eternality-non-eternality and so forth. Nevertheless, we have to express

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[5] *L. Sūtra*, Lxxxiii.

it in language and this we do by attributing to it characters contrary to the characters of worldly objects. We conceive and characterise it in a negative way. It is eternal because worldly objects are non-eternal. It is Suchness, that is, Such-as-it-is, because it is undefinable, while worldly objects are definable. It is Brahma, that is, universal, or Dharma-dhātu, that is, the universal basic principle in all Dharmas, because worldly objects are isolated. It is Light, Consciousness, Knowledge, because the world is dark, unconscious, ignorant. It is fearlessness, because the world is frightful. It is Bliss because the world is sorrowful. It is homogeneous (sama), because the world is heterogeneous. It is Nirvana, because the world is saṁsāra. It is the container of all merits because the world is so deficient in them. Again, there is the idea that because it alone exists while the world does not, the world which is perceived as existing is in it, or of it. Hence it is called Bhūtatathatā (Existent-such-as-it-is, absolute Existence), Ālaya-vijñāna (the home of the vijñānas or repository consciousness), Tathāgatagarbha (the womb of tathāgata), Dharmadhātu (the material of the Dharmas), and Dharmakāya (the body of the Dharmas). It is Citta-mātra, or Mind itself, because while it has no mentation it is the basic principle of the worldly mind which mentates[6]. It is Vijñāna-mātra, or Consciousness itself, because while it is not conscious of any object, it is the source of the worldly consciousness of objects.[7] Says Aśvaghoṣa, "If the mind being awakened perceives an external world, then there will be something that cannot be perceived by it. But the essence of the mind has nothing to do with perception (which presupposes the dual existence of a perceiving subject and an object perceived); so there is nothing that cannot be perceived by it (that is, the world of relativity is submerged in the oneness of Suchness).

[6] verse 27.

[7] verses 45-47.

Thence we assign to Suchness this quality, the universal illumination of the universe (it is the Dharmadhātu)".[8] The Dharmadhātu, that is, the Dharma as Tathatā, and the world, that is, the Dharmas as Nimitta, Nāma and Vikalpa, being thus in one sense contradictory and in another sense the same, the qualities which we attribute to the Dhrama-dhātu with our eye to it on the one hand and the world on the other, must of necessity be incomprehensible, heterogeneous from the worldly standpoint and homogeneous from the transcendental standpoint. Hence Aśvaghoṣa says, "There is no heterogeneity in all these Buddha-dharmas (qualities of the Buddha) which, outnumbering the sands of the Ganges, can be neither identical (ekārtha) nor non-identical (nānārtha), and which, therefore are out of the range of our comprehension".[9] But if we can turn our eye from the world with a deep conviction that it is not, our vision will land on the transcendent Such-as-it-is which is neither ignorance nor knowledg , neither saṁsāra (birth-and-death) nor Nirvāṇa (emancipation), neither the Dharmas nor the Dharmadhātu. Hence, the Buddha said, "The discriminated by discrimination exist not, and discrimination does not obtain; discrimination being thus unobtainable, there is neither transmigration nor nirvaṇa".[10] And, again, "In all things there is no self-nature, they are mere words of people; that which is discriminated has no reality. Nirvāṇa is like a dream; nothing is seen to be in transmigration, nor does anything enter into Nirvāṇa."[11] With an eye to the world we must say, "Suchness, emptiness, (reality—) limit, Nirvāṇa, the Dharmadhātu, no-birth of all things, self-being— these characterise the highest truth."[12] Taking out our eye from

[8] *Awakening of Faith*, p. 97.
[9] *Awakening of Faith*. p. 96.
[10] *L. Sutra*, Sagathakam, 621.
[11] *L. Sūtra*, xxxiv.
[12] *Sagāthakam*, 576.

the world we have to say, "In the state of imagelessness there is no reality, no Parikalpita, no Paratantra, no five Dharmas, no two-fold mind".[13] Following the spirit of the Sūtra Nāgārjuna formulated his eight "No's" for defining the Ultimate Reality:

"Anirodham-anutpādam-anucchedamaśāśvatam-
anekārthamanānārtham-anāgamamanirgamam.
Yaḥ Pratītyasamutpādam prapañcopaśamaṁ śivam
deśayāmāsa sambuddhastam vande vadatām varam."[14]

—I adore the greatest of speakers, the fully-enlightened one, who taught the Reality in which there is no destruction, no origination, no annihilation, no eternality, no one-thingness, no many-thingness, no coming in, no going out, mutual origination, quiescence of the multiple world.

In the same spirit Gauḍapāda formulates his six "No's" for the same purpose:

"Na nirodho na cotpattir—
na baddho na ca sādhakaḥ.
na mumukṣur na vai mukta
ityeṣā paramārthatā."[15]

—no destruction, no origination, nobody in bondage, no devotee, nobody desirous of emancipation, nobody emancipated, this is the essence of Paramārthatā (ultimate reality).

Tathatā, or Suchness, is undefinable. But, for that reason, we are not to think that it is not, it is Such-as-it-is. The sense of the verb "to be" is inherent in everybody, it is the springhead of every one of our activities, physical or mental. I can never reasonably say that I am not, for that very 'saying' proves that I am. In fact, nobody feels his non-existence. But every thoughtful man feels that the form which his existence takes varies and in our worldly life we are concerned with only froms of existence which are

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[13] *Sagāthakam*, 569.

[14] *Mādhyamika Vṛtti* Kārikā.

[15] Vaitathyaprakaraṇa 32.

impermanent and therefore unreal. Existence itself must, for this reason, be different from the forms of existence which are perceptible to us. In this sense the world is unborn as is the flower in the sky, without any substantiality or self-nature or ātmā, that is, a permanent principle of individuality, in it. In another sense the worldly forms of existence are nothing but Existence itself as it appears to our wordly vision and are hence permanent and eternal, not as individulas and particulars but as the universal Existence itself which is consequently termed the Dharmadhātu. What has been said above about Existence itself is true also about Light itself, named Citta or Vijñāna, for they are one and not different—to say that there is existence that is not revealed amounts to saying that existence is not existent. It is also Bliss itself, for here there is eternal rest from the conflicts of the dualistic world. The Buddha said, "When it is understood that there is nothing in the world but what is seen of the Mind itself, discrimination no more rises, and one is thus established in his own abode which is the realm of no-work."[16] Thus Tathatā is Existence, Light and Bliss, the three being one in it although differently perceived in the dualistic vision. This teaching is conveyed in verses 91 to 93.

The two Dharmas, Samyag-jñāna and Tathatā, which are really the one absolute monistic principle, form the Pariniṣpaṇṇa svabhāva of existence, the true reality, the Paramārtha.

"Nimitta, Nāma and Vikalpa (correspond to) the two forms of svabhāva and Samyag-jñāna and Tathatā to the Pariniṣpaṇṇa form."[17]

"Samyag-jñāna and Tathatā, Mahāmati, are indestructible and thus they are known as Pariniṣpaṇṇa."[18]

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[16] *L. Sūtra*, Lxxvii.
[17] *L. Sūtra*, xxiii.
[18] *L. Sūtra*, Lxxxiii.

As the Dharmas are not capable of being dealt with separately as independent ones, they are generally treated together throughout the treatise. Verses 24 to 74 are, however, devoted specially to Nimitta, Nāma and Vikalpa, and verses 75 to 100 to Samyag-jñāna and Tathatā.

EPISTEMOLOGY

Three kinds of jñāna— *Laukika Śuddhalaukika*, and *Lokottara*.

In Laukika jñāna there is object as well as perception, in Śuddhalaukika jñāna there is no object but there is perception, in Lokottara jñāna there is neither object nor perception.

Existence and knowledge go together, for existence is the object of knowledge, the knowable. In the dualistic world they are different, but in the monistic realm they are one. Hence, corresponding to existence as samvṛti and Paramārtha there is knowledge as samvṛti and Paramārtha, and to existence as Parikalpita, Paratantra and Pariniṣpaṇṇa (or Paramārtha) there is knowledge as Parikalpita, Paratantra and Pariniṣpaṇṇa (or Paramārtha). In the subdivision of existence into five Dharmas Paramārtha, the monistic existence, is subdivided, for the easy understanding of unenlightened people, into Samyag-jñāna and Tathatā, but here knowledge and the knowable being one and the same, the corresponding knowledge which embraces both of them in its transcendental and self-revealing grasp is called transcendental knowledge or Lokottara jñāna, or simply, Jñāna. It is also called in Mahāyāna literature Ārya-jñāna, or noble wisdom, and Prajñā or highest knowledge. It is "the wise knowledge, the wise insight, the wise transcendental vision of the wise which is neither human nor celestial."[19]

(To be continued)

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[19] *L. Sūtra*, lxix.

RAVANA IN THE KAILĀSA TEMPLE AT ELLORA[1]

By C. SIVARAMAMURTI

THERE are two ways of describing the superior qualities of a great hero. According to the recognised canons of Sanskrit literary criticism it is either a direct narration of the qualities of the hero or an indirect praise of the hero by recounting special distinctive traits of the outstanding opponent vanquished by him—अथवा प्रतिपक्षस्य वर्णयित्वा गुणान् बहून् ।

This latter is the better and probably a more telling manner of achieving the purpose of making clear the greatness of the hero. Vālmīki is eloquent in describing the great qualities of Rāvaṇa, his royal splendour, his personality, his prowess and so forth. The canto in the Sundarakāṇḍa where Hanūman admires Rāvaṇa is one of the loveliest pictures of a vanquished hero painted in all his glory by the poet. If Hanūmān exclaims—

अहो रूपमहो सत्त्वं अहो धैर्यमहो धृतिः ।
अहो राक्षसराजस्य सर्वलक्षणयुक्तता[2] ॥

and reflects

यद्यधर्मो न बलवान् स्यादयं राक्षसेश्वरः ।
स्यादयं सुरलोकस्य सशक्रस्यापि रक्षिता[3] ॥

his wonder is not without reason and his reflection only shows that if the great Rāvaṇa perished—Rāvaṇa who could have easily been a protector even of the gods including Indra himself, the lord of the devas—it was just because of the magnitude of his sins and not because he lacked personal valour.

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[1] Paper read in the Indian History Congress 1949, December.
[2] Sundarakāṇḍa, Adhyāya 49. Verse 17.
[3] Ibid, Verse 18.

It is all the more sad when we remember that Rāvaṇa almost achieved the impossible by getting impossible boons conferred on him and by pleasing Śiva by the recitation of Sāmas when actually he was in the greatest agony with his mighty frame that shook Kailāsa crushed under the intolerable weight of the gigantic mountain pressed down with little or no effort by Śiva by a mere twist of his toe to assuage the fear of his spouse and his gaṇa followers who were alarmed at this unusual upheaval of their abode.

Indeed this bravado action of Rāvaṇa has so captured the imagination and admiration of later-day poets that there is practically no poet who refers to Rāvaṇa and does not mention this great act of his. Though he suffered defeat here and paid dearly for his overbearing haughty spirit, he, however on this account, won the blessing of Lord Śiva by recitation of Sāma hymns under the most difficult circumstances. He thus became a great devotee of Siva, nay, he was counted among the foremost of Siva-bhaktas, and could take rank with such gaṇas as had their backs purified by the holy touch of the foot of Śiva पादार्पणानुग्रहपूतपृष्ठम्[4]. No doubt Rājaśekhara emphasises only the fall of Rāvaṇa but nevertheless recounts his great exploits. There is great emphasis on Rāvaṇa's devotion to Śiva. Earlier Bāṇa shows his great appreciation of Ravana as Śiva-bhakta by describing the dust particles on Śiva's feet which he chooses as the subject of one of his Maṅgala-ślokas of his *Kādambarī*, as kissed by a circle of crowns of the ten-headed Rāvaṇa and fondled on the head of the demon king Bāna.

जयन्ति बाणासुरमौलिलालिता दशास्यचूडामणिचक्रचुम्बिनः ।
सुरासुराधीशशिखान्तशायिनो भवच्छिदस्त्र्यम्बकपादपांसवः[5] ॥

The āsuric quality of both Bāṇa and Rāvaṇa are forgotten or rather obscured in the thought that they are among the

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[4] *Raghuvaṁśa* II. 35.

[5] Verse 2.

foremost of the devotees of Siva. In all later literature Bāna and Rāvana figure as Śiva-bhaktas par excellence. The Siva-bhakti aspect of Rāvana has really made not only poets eloquent but also sculptors in portraying graphically his mighty exploits. Such lines as—दशमुखभुजोच्छ्वसितप्रस्थसन्धेः in the *Meghadūta*[6] show with what fervour the achievements of Rāvaṇa are recalled, all because of his unique position as a great Śiva-bhakta.

But the Śiva-bhakti of Rāvaṇa is not so strikingly expressed or emphasised in the *Rāmāyaṇa* as in still later literature. It is in fact Kālidāsa, the great Śiva-bhakta who is, with the utmost catholic outlook, ready to merge the three aspects of the supreme being—

एकैव मूर्त्तिर्विभिदे त्रिधा सा सामान्यमेषां प्रथमावरत्वम् ।
विष्णोर्हरस्तस्य हरिः कदाचिद्वेधास्तयोस्तावपि धातुराद्यौ[7] ॥

that stressed this aspect of Rāvaṇa's Śiva-bhakti. Sculpture so adopted this that one of the great themes of Śiva iconography came to be known as *Rāvaṇānugrahamūrti*. There is probably no region in India or monument claiming to represent Śiva lacking one or more panels representing *Rāvaṇānugraha-mūrti*. Among the most famous are those from Elephanta, Ellora, and the Pallava structural temples at Conjeeveram.

Kālidāsa has emphasised the great Śiva-bhakti of Rāvaṇa as also his unparralleled valour by utilising the method of best praising the hero by painting the opponent overcome by him in the brightest colours. The verse runs thus:

जेतारं लोकपालानां स्वमुखैरर्चितेश्वरम् ।
रामस्तुलितकैलासं अरातिं बह्वमन्यत ॥[8]

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[6] Pūrvamegha, Verse 61.
[7] *Kumāra* VII. 44.
[8] *Raghu* XII. 89.

When we know from the line of Kālidāsa पञ्चमं लोकपालानाम्[9] where he describes a great king as almost a fifth or additional lokapāla to the existing four Yama-Kubera-Jaleśvara and Vajrī, in what awe and respect the might of the Lokapālas was held, we can at once see why Rāvana should be counted as the most valiant, as the vanquisher of the Lords of the quarters. Kālidāsa does not give a picture of Rāvaṇa except as the true victor of the Lokapālas. In the *Rāmāyaṇa* we know that Rāvaṇa's victory over the Lokapālas was just a sham as his real power lay not so much in his personal strength as in his boon won from Brahma whom he worshipped with great fervour and pleased by offering his heads in the sacrificial fire. This version of the horripulating act of cutting and offering his heads to Brahmā represents apparently the earlier tradition when Brahmā was still reckoned as a force, was a deity of importance, and not as he was conceived at a later date as not deserving of even a temple for his worship. He was still the *Pitāmaha*, the revered grandfather of the gods. We thus find him wearing a beard in his early representations of the Kushāna period. But later, he lost his position. The Guptas were so devoted to Viṣṇu and poor Brahmā had become so weak in his claim for worship from devotees that Viṣṇu was conceived as the Prapitāmaha the great-grandfather of the gods as we find mention in the *Viṣṇusahasranāma* of the *Mahābhārata*; but as Viṣṇu himself is *Puruṣottama*, Lord of Srī and Sarasvatī, the gay and valiant god decorated with the jewel Kaustubha and the mark Śrīvatsa, wearer of the yellow silken garment, he is always represented as a young *Tridaśa*, and the god sprung from his navel lotus could not wear the beard that he lacked, and both were denied signs of old age. At any rate the *utkarṣa* here is for Viṣṇu. A little later Śivotkarṣa is emphasised at Ellora by portraying liṅgodbhava where Śiva

[9] *Raghu.* xvii. 78.



Fig. 1—Rāvaṇa shaking Kailāsa



Fig. 2— Rāvana offering his heads to Śiva

appearing in a flaming pillar baffles both Brahmā and Viṣṇu who fail to realise his mighty personality. Though Kālidāsa as a Vedāntin with unbiased mind refers to the Trinity as each one excelling the other two in turn only for functional purposes all the three being equal, still like Madhusūdana Sarasvatī who in spite of his being an Advaitin cannot but conceive of the lotus-eyed moon-faced child Kṛṣṇa with the flute in his hand for all his talk of the formless absolute Brahman, Kālidāsa still has his predeliction for Śiva. It does not appear as a pure ideosyncracy of the individual but rather represents the spirit of the age. If Kālidāsa has changed the story of Rāvaṇa's offering his heads to Brahmā into that of one in which the offering is made to Śiva it is not certainly his innovation but in all probability represents the spirit of the age when such stories gained currency. We know archaeologically speaking that Siva worship was in great favour about the beginning of the Christian era. The *Rudradhyaya* is almost embodied in the concept of Rudra and Agni in the personified figure on the Guḍimallam liṅga. The inscribed Śiva-liṅga showing the five-faces of Sadāśiva from near Bhiṭa and other Śiva-liṅgas from Mathurā dating round about the Christian era as also the effigy of Siva on Kushāṇa coins have their own story to tell. Anyway, it is as a Śiva-bhakta *par excellence* that Ravaṇa emerges in mediaeval Indian sculpture and literature. At Ellora it is not merely the spirited representation of his lifting the Kailāsa mountain (Pl I) than which probably there is no better representation of the scene anywhere else, the tremor of Pārvatī clinging to Siva for protection and the large number of Gaṇa hosts looking up to their lord who takes the whole thing as pure fun by the easy posture and turned face noticeable in the sculpture as also the impossible foolhardy attempt of the ten- headed one so small under so huge a mountain which even he could however, shake only to be crushed by the little toe of the Lord, but also the rare panel representing Rāvaṇa's offering

his heads to Siva (pl. II). Ravana is here shown kneeling before a Śiva-liṅga garlanded by nine heads placed all around it as if strung together and cutting his last head as the final offering to Śiva. Probably there is no other sculpture anywhere else to represent this great act of Ravana. The great hero that Rāvana as Śiva-bhakta became was no longer a sham conqueror of the gods of the quarters but actually appealed to all as one who could have easily overcome even those and it was taken for granted that he did conquer the divine guardians of the quarters. No wonder Rāma thought very highly of his opponent who had overcome the Lords of the quarters, who had adored Siva by offering his heads, who had lifted Mount Kailāsa. Now when this verse emanates from the greatest and sweetest of the poets of the land and the exploits draw pointed attention to Kailāsa, a mountain in emulation of which the Kailāsa temple itself so named after the great mountain as we find mentioned in the inscriptions themselves of the Rāṣṭrakūṭas, should we not expect great attention to be paid to this particular verse, and the exploits of so great a Śiva-bhakta, in a temple of Śiva himself, in a kingdom, where, earlier under the Cālukyas, Kālidāsa and Bhāravi have their glory sung in an inscription from Aihoḷe. Great was Rāvaṇa and greater his exploits and greater still the hero who overcame him whose story is also narrated at Ellora.

THE POLITICAL TERM 'UDĀSĪNA'

By Dasharatha Sharma

Udāsīna is a well known term of Ancient Indian Politics regarding the significance of which scholars have differed among themselves. Dr. R. Shamasastry translated it as 'neutral',[1] and has been criticised for doing so, among others, by Dr. N. N. Law according to whom the *Udāsīna* was "the strongest power we have to imagine within the first zone of the central state",[2] and was so called not because of its neutrality but its being "seated on a height", i.e., being very powerful.

That the *Udāsīna* was a very strong power is obvious enough. It is described in the *Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra* as "capable of helping the enemy, the *vijigīṣu*, and the *Madhyama* king, together or individually or of resisting any of them individually". From this it naturally follows that the *Udāsīna* state was much stronger than any other in the *maṇḍal*; its resources, human as well as material, exceeded those of others.[3] But I am not sure whether Dr. Law is right in putting it within the first zone of the *vijigīṣu* or central state, and in dismissing wholly also the idea of neutrality from its commentary on the *Kāmandakīya Nītisāra* which interprets the word, *bahiḥ*, of Kāmandaka's definition of *Udāsīna*[4] as "*vijigīṣor-bhumyanantara*", and in doing so goes, I think, against the original text.

In my opinion the best way to determine the real meaning of the term, *Udāsīna*, is to go back to authorities

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[1] *Arthaśāstra*, English translation, 3rd Edition, pp. 290-291.

[2] *International Relations in Ancient India*, Part 1, pp. 10-11 and 13.

[3] It is described as '*prakṛtibhyo balavattaraḥ*'. See the *Kauṭilīya* definition quoted in the next paragraph.

[4] See Kāmandaka's definition quoted in the next paragraph.

as old as possible, to Kauṭilya and Kamandaka themselves and also to our other old writers on Indian Polity like Manu and Yājñavalkya. First let us have Kauṭilya. His definition, which we have partly paraphrased above, is as follows:[5]—

"*ari-vijigīṣu-madhyamanaṁ bahiḥ prakṛtibhyo balavattaraḥ saṁhatāsaṁhatanaṁ-ari-vijigīṣu-madhyamanaṁ-anugrahe samartho nigrahe cāsaṁhatanaṁ-udasīnaḥ.*

Herein the *Udāsīna* is placed *beyond* the *ari*, *vijigīṣu* and *madhyama* states. But what does the word, beyond (*bahiḥ*) mean? Had it signified *bhūmyanantara*, i.e. a state within the first zone, as opined by Dr. Law, Kauṭilya might himself have said so. He uses the word, *bhūmyanantara*, frequently and is particular about the exactness of his definitions. Regarding the *Kamandakīya Nītisāra*, the interpretation of which Dr. Law quotes, we shall let the readers decide for themselves. Here are its relevant verses:—[6]

Areśca vijigīṣośca madhyamo bhūmyanantaraḥ,
anugrahe saṁhatayor-vyastayor-nigrahe prabhuḥ.
Maṇḍalād-bahir-eteṣāṁ-udāsino balaṁvitaḥ,
anugrahe saṁhatanaṁ vyastānāṁ caiva yo prabhuḥ.

Does not Kāmandaka here put the *Udāsīna* beyond not merely the *ari*, the *vijigīṣu*, and the *Madhyama*, but even their *maṇḍalas*? The *Agni Purāṇa* and the *Sarasvatīvilasa* advocate the same view, reproducing almost *verbatim* Kāmandaka's verses.[7] It was, obviously, thus a distant state, a fact confirmed also by what others have to say on the subject.

The *Manusmṛti*, which probably derives its *arthaśāstra* material from the same source as the *Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra*

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[5] VI, 2. Gaṇapati Sāstri s edition, II, p. 233.

[6] VIII. 18-19.

[7] Quoted by Mahāmahopādhyāya P. V. Kane in his '*History of Dharmasastra Literature*, III, p. 220, footnote 293.

and was composed within a century or two of it, speaks of the *Udāsīna* as—

"*Anantaram-arim vidyād-ari-sevinameva ca,*

arer-anantaraṁ mitram-udāsīnam tayoḥ paraṁ.[8]

The '*paraṁ*' of this verse is synonymous with '*bahiḥ*' of Kauṭilya's definition; and as to what *paraṁ* and *bahiḥ* meant we might well refer to Sarvajñanārāyaṇa who calls the *Udāsīna* a *sarvato bāhya* state, i.e., a realm that stands outside the *maṇḍalas* of *madhyama*, *ari* and *mitra*.[9]

Regarding the normal distance between the *vijigīṣu* and the *Udāsīna* state we get welcome light from the *Yājñavalkyasmṛti*, the composition of which is assigned by Mahāmahopādhyāya P.V. Kane to the period of 100 to 300 A.D.,[10] in other words, to a time when the actual meaning of technical terms like *Udāsīna* had not probably been forgotten. Yājñavalkya's definition, "*Arir-mitram-udāsinonantaras-tatparaḥ paraḥ*",[11] though brief, has the great merit of being unambiguous. As explained by the *Mitākṣarā* (1070-1100 A. D.), the line means that the state adjacent to the *vijigīṣu* was the *prākṛta* enemy ;[12] next to it stood the *prākṛta* friend, and further still came the *Udāsīna*, the state separated from the *vijigīṣu* by the *maṇḍalas* of *ari* and *mitra*.[13] Nandana, a commentator on the *Manusmṛti*, held the same view.[14] Thus, originally, the word *Udāsīna* referred not only to a state "seated on a height" but also to one "seated at some distance".[15]

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[8] VII, 158.

[9] See his comment on *Manu.*, VII, 155.

[10] *History of Dharmaśāstra Literature*, III, xvii.

[11] See *Yājñavalkyasmṛti*, I, 345 with the *Mitākṣarā* commentary on it.

[12] *Pārkṛta* is a technical term; hence it is left untranslated. 'Potential' may be a fairly satisfactory rendering.

[13] *Anantaraḥ prākṛtoriḥ; tatparaḥ prākṛtam mitraṁ, tasmātparaḥ udāsīnaḥ .... pārṣṇigrābākrandāsārādayastvarimitrodāsineṣvantarbhavanti iti yogīśvareṇaāpṛthaguktāḥ.*

[14] See *Manu*, VII, 158 (1), Mandalik's edition, p. 833.

[15] Monier Williams notes the second sense only in his *Sanskrit-English Dictionary*.

The idea of an *Udāsīna's* neutrality is also fairly old. Distance from the *vijigīṣu* being one of the chief bases of enmity and friendship in Kauṭilyan politics, it was only natural that an *Udāsīna*, i.e. a strong state situated at some distance, should take a lukewarm or neutral attitude as regards the *vijigīṣu's* ambitions. "A ruler", says Kauṭilya, "who is distant, satisfied and strong, and at the same time averse to exertion remains neutral."[16] In fact this neutrality seems to have been so common a characteristic of the *Udāsīna* state that Kauṭilya lays down the general rule even that "to help an *Udāsīna* with military forces in return for money is an undertaking that leads neither to good nor bad after-effects".[17] Had the *Udāsīna* signified merely a strong state that would normally take an unfriendly attitude towards the *vijigīṣu*, military help of this sort would be extremely risky; it might render stronger a potential enemy who is already strong enough. But a first-class *Udāsīna*, as stated by Manu, was *sthūla-lakṣa*, i.e. one who always tolerated the prosperity of the *vijigīṣu*.

To sum up an *Udāsīna* of the Indian political system appears to have been an *udāsina* in practically all the important senses of the term. He was "highly seated" or extremely powerful; "situated at a distance" from the *vijigīṣus* and for these very reasons generally "neutral", as regards the conflicts between the *vijigīṣu* and his enemies. Dr. N. N. Law is right in assigning to the term the first of these meanings, but the other senses too need not be excluded. The second sense, just mentioned, can specially be backed by evidence of the most reliable nature and of an age not far removed from Kauṭilya's *Arthaśāstra*, wherein we find the word used for the first time and given a sense which is largely technical and in some ways different from that assigned to it in common parlance.

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17 *Arthaśāstra*, VII, 9.

16 *Ibid.*, IX, 7. Gaṇapati Śāstri's edition, III, p. 91.

18 VII, 211. I have followed Medhātithi's interpretation.

THE VIDUṢAKA IN THE NAGANANDA OF HARSAVARDHANA

By R. C. Hazra

Sanskrit rhetoricians ascribe two main functions to the Vidūṣaka in Sanskrit dramas, viz., (1) he is the fun-maker (हास्यकृत्) meant for introducing comic relief not only by his speeches but also by his appearance, dress, movements and activities, and (2) he is the नर्मसचिव of his patron, very often royal, and, as such, he is to help and advise the latter in his love-affairs[1]. These two aspects of the Vidūṣaka's character have been given prominence more or less in almost all the dramas. A few dramatists, again, have added another trait to his character, viz., that of foolishness. But none of the rhetoricians describe him as a fool, nor do the majority of the dramatists paint him as such. So, his comparison with the Elizabethan Fool is, in most cases, unfounded and unjustifiable. No one can be a successful fun-maker and an able guide in love-pursuits unless one possesses sufficient intelligence for his job; and this patent fact was not lost sight of by the rhetoricians and the dramatists of note. What an important part the Vidūṣaka played in turning the quietistic hero Jīmūtavāhana into a passionate lover and how intelligently and cautiously he managed to bring

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[1] See, for instance, Bharata's *Nāṭya-śāstra* (ed. Nirṇaya Sāgara Press, Bombay), xii. 121-122, xxi. 126, and xxiv. 106; Rudraṭa's *Kāvyālaṃkāra* (ed. Nirṇaya Sāgara Press, Bombay), 12. 13-15; *Agni-purāṇa* (ed. Vangavāsi Press, Calcutta), 339. 38-39; Dhanañjaya's *Daśa-rūpaka* (ed. Nirṇaya Sāgara Press, Bombay), 2. 13; Bhojadeva's *Sarasvatī-kaṇṭhā-bharaṇa* (ed. Jīvānanda Vidyāsāgara, Calcutta), 5. 598; Vidyānātha's *Pratāprudra-yaśo-bhūṣaṇa* (ed. Trivedi), 1. 40; Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra's *Nāṭya-darpaṇa* with their own commentary (ed. Gaekwad Oriental Series), 4. 167; Singa-bhūpāla's *Rasārṇava- sudhākara*, 1. 92; Bhānudatta's *Rasa-mañjarī* (ed. R. S. Tailaṅga), p. 231; Viśvanātha's *Sāhitya-darpaṇa*, 3. 30 and 42; and so on.

about this change, we shall see below from an analysis of his activities in the First Act of the *Nāgānanda*[2].

In this Act Jīmūtavāhana is introduced as enumerating the various evils of youth with a sincere feeling of indifference (निर्वेद) and ardently wishing to be able to employ, as he was doing, the entire period of this baneful and censurable youth in rendering devout service to his parents by living with them in the hermitage. This attitude, though quite admirable as well as natural on the part of Jīmūtavāhana, was totally foreign to the Vidūṣaka. It did not appeal to him at all. Rather, he found in it an unlucky chance of being deprived of the much desired joys and comforts of the royal palace for a long and indefinite period. So he got furious, but his fury could not make him lose his balance of mind and forget his own interest. He knew fully well that every human being, however strong he might be for the time being, was really very weak and susceptible to the lower instincts very natural to him. So, in order to excite such instincts in Jīmūtavāhana and thereby to make him averse to the service of his parents and prone to the pleasures of sovereignty enjoyable at one's will, he said, though angrily:[3]

"भो वअस्स, णं निव्विण्णो एव तुमं एत्तिअं कालं एदाणं जीवन्तमुआणं किदे इमं ईदिसं वणवासदुक्खं अणुहवन्तो ! ता पसीद। दाणिं पि दाव गुरुचरण-सुस्सूसानिव्वन्धादो निअत्तिअ इच्छापरिभोगरमणिज्जं रज्जसुहं अणुहवीअदु ।"

("Look here, my friend, you must have got tired of suffering so long such miseries of a forest-life for the sake of these two who are as good as dead. So, be pleased, and, desisting even now from your importunity of serving the feet of your parents, enjoy the pleasures of royalty which are charming because one can enjoy them fully at one's own will"). By cautiously using the words 'जीवन्तमुआणं" and 'इच्छा-परिभोगरमणिज्जं' the Vidūṣaka tried to excite in Jīmūtavāhana

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[2] In writing this article I have used Nerurkar's edition of the *Nāgānanda*.

[3] p. (3).

a feeling of disregard for his old parents and to rouse in him a strong desire for the manifold pleasures of the senses which royalty could yield to the fullest extent. But this first attempt, or rather attack, of the Vidūṣaka had no effect on the hero, who pointed out to him inexorably that it was devout service to one's superiors, and not sovereignty, that could bring glory to one. The Vidūṣaka appreciated, though not with much pleasure, the sincerity of Jīmūtavāhana's attitude, but he did not feel discouraged. He thought deeply for a moment and instantaneously changed his tactics. This time he tried to appeal to the nobler sentiments of Jīmutavahana by reminding him of his duties to his subjects[4]. But Jımutavahana baffled this attempt of the Viduṣaka also by assuring the latter that he had already done everything that was necessary for ensuring the safety and prosperity of his kingdom. Though thus made twice unsuccessful, the Vidūṣaka was not a man to beat a retreat. He immediately made a third attempt by drawing Jīmūtavāhana's attention to his daring rival Mataṅga, with the hope that this time he would be able to attract the latter to his kingdom by exciting in him a feeling of jealousy and rage which was very difficult for a human being to shake off under provocation. But Jımutavāhana damped all his spirit by saying that he was eager to sacrifice even his own body for the sake of others, not to speak of his kingdom, and that they should not tax their brain by thinking of such petty things but should carry out the order of his father by finding out a place suitable for a hermitage on the Malaya mountain. Thus stopped by the hero the Vidūṣaka felt extremely disappointed and said helplessly

[4] Cf. the Vidūṣaka's speech "(आत्मगतम्) अहो अस्स गुरुचरणसुस्सूसाणुराओ! (विचिन्त्य) भोदु ता एदं पि दाव भणिस्सं। (प्रकाशम्) भो वअस्स ण खु अहं रज्जसुहं ज्जेव केवलं उद्दिसिअ एवं भणामि। अण्णं पि दे करणीअं अत्थि एव्व।" (p.3). ["(To himself) Oh his passion for serving the feet of his parents! (Reflecting) Well, then I shall say this also. (Aloud) My friend, cer!tainly I do not speak all this, referring to the pleasures of sovereignty alone; there is indeed something else which has to be done by you.']

"ज भवं आणवेदि" ("As your Highness commands"). But as they approached the Malaya mountain they came in contact wth the fragrant and soothing Malaya breeze which removed all fatigue of the hero and caused horripilation on his body. This gave a chance to the Vidūṣaka, who exclaimed :

> "भो वअस्स, पेक्ख पेक्ख, एसो क्खु सरसघणचन्दणवणुस्संगपरिमिलणलग्न-बहलपरिमलो विसमतडोपहदजज्जरितणिज्झरुच्छलिदसिसिरसीअरासारवाही पढमसंगमुक्कण्ठिदपिआकष्ठग्गही विअ मग्गपरिस्समं अवणअन्तो रोमञ्चेदि पिअवअस्सं मलअमारुदो।"[5]

["Behold, behold; Oh friend, how this Malaya breeze, carrying a strong fragrance by its contact with the very heart of the forests of juicy and dense sandal trees and wafting showers of cool spray shooting up from the streams shattered by dashing against the rugged banks, horripilates (the body of) my dear friend while removing the fatigue of the journey, like the embrace of one's beloved eager for the first union"]. By way of describing the nature and effect of the Malaya breeze the Vidūṣaka very cleverly suggested to the hero the extremely pleasant experiences of first love in married life. The words 'पढमसंगमुक्कण्ठिदपिआकण्ठग्गहो विअ', used by the Vidūṣaka, must not have gone unnoticed by the hero, but the latter directed his attention to the beauty and grandeur of the Malaya mountain, which made his mind eager in an indescribable way (किमपि चेतः करोत्युत्सुकम्—p. 5). What this eagerness was really for, the hero could not understand clearly. It might be that the sweet sound he heared on the Malaya mountain and the beautiful scenery he saw there, together with the impression the Vidūṣaka gave him of first love, revived in his subconscious mind the memory of his beloved whose embrace used to thrill his body in his previous birth[6]. Whatever it might be, the hero was attra-

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[5] pp. 4-5.

cted by the mountain, and he decided to have a hermitage there. When they were climbing the mountain to find out a suitable place for the purpose, the right eye of the hero throbbed, foretelling some good at hand. This was encouraging to the Vidūṣaka, although he did not know what kind of good would accrue to the hero. However, while roaming about on the mountain, they came to a beautiful and quiet penance-grove which was first discovered by the Vidūṣaka from the arrangement and colour of trees, the rise of heavy masses of smoke impregnated with the sweet smell of clarified butter, and the fearlessness of the beasts of prey lying there. In this penance-grove the Vidūṣaka further observed that the deer were listening to something very carefully by controlling their limbs and activities. The hero also noticed it and said that these beasts were listening to a sweet song sung by somebody at a distance to the accompaniment of a lute. The Vidūṣaka could not make out whether this song was being sung by a male or by a female,[7] but the hero, who was an expert in music, could easily understand that it was a divine female who was worshipping a deity in that way. This revelation further encouraged the Vidūṣaka who said enthusiastically "भो वअस्स, एहि, अम्हे वि देवदाअदणं पेक्खम्ह" ("Come, O friend, we also shall visit the temple"), as if he had great devotion for deities. The hero first agreed to his proposal as he also wished to show respect to the deity, but as soon as he thought that it was a female who was singing there, he stopped and waited with the Vidūṣaka behind the group of Tamāla trees for an opportunity for seeing the

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[6] Cf. रम्याणि वीक्ष्य मधुरांश्च निशम्य शब्दान्
पर्युत्सुकीभवति यत् सुखितोऽपि जन्तुः ।
तच्चेतसा स्मरति नूनमबोधपूर्वं
भावस्थिराणि जननान्तरसौहृदानि ।।

Abhijñāna-Śākuntala, Act. V.

[7] Cf. the querry of the Vidūṣaka 'भो वअस्स, को उण एसो तवोवणे गाअदि ?' Note the word 'को' used in the masculine gender.

great extent and elicited high praise from him. This song as well as the words of the maid servant (चेटी) accompanying the female revealed that the latter was an unmarried girl trying perseveringly for a long time to please the goddess Gaurī for the fulfilment of her desire (obviously for a worthy husband). As soon as the Vidūṣaka learnt that the girl was an unmarried one, he saw a bright ray of hope and felt very much encouraged. Wishing to bring about a meeting between the hero and the girl, he said: "भो वअस्स, कण्णआ खु एसा, ता किं ण पेक्खम्ह ?" ("My friend, she is indeed a maiden; so, why should we not have a look at her ?)." The hero, whose mind the girl had already influenced by the purity and sweetness of her character, her skill in music, and her sincere devotion to the goddess, and who was feeling a sort of weakness in his mind, readily supported his friend saying: "को दोषः ? कन्यका हि निर्दोषदर्शना भवन्ति" ("What harm can there be, for, there is no sin in looking at a maiden"). But owing partially to his shyness consequent upon the first dawn of love in him and partially due to his eagerness to see the girl to his heart's content, he could not present himself before her immediately but proposed to see her like a thief from behind the thicket on the pretext that she might feel confused at their sight and disappear without delay. The Vidūṣaka agreed to his proposal and noticed the girl from their hiding place. He was very much astonished at the girl's extraordinary physical beauty and drew the attention of the hero to it saying:

> "भो वअस्स, पेक्ख पेक्ख, अहह अच्छरिअं! ण केवलं वीणाविण्णाणेणेव कण्णाणं सुहं करेदि जाव इमिणा वीणाविण्णाणाणुरुवेण रुवेण वि अच्छिणं सुहं उप्पादेदि। का एसा उण भविस्सदि ? किं दाव देवी, अहवा णाअकण्णआ, आहो विज्जाहरदारिआ, उदाहो सिद्धकुलसंभवेत्ति ?"[8]

("Behold, my friend, behold: O, what a wonder: She

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[8] p. 8.

not only pleases the ears by her skill in the lute but also gives delight to the eyes by her form which is worthy of that skill. Who then can she be? Is she a goddess, or a Nāga maiden, or a Vidyāḍhara girl, or one born in the race of the Siddhas?") The hero, who was powerfully attracted by her beauty began to see her with wistful eyes and said in praise that the race or place, in which she was born was really blessed. The Vidūṣaka, who was intelligent enough to notice this change in the hero, took himself to be crowned with success and said to himself joyfully: "दिट्ठिआ चिरस्स दाव कालस्स पडिदो खु एसो गोअरे मम्महस्स। अहवा णहि णहि मम एव्व एक्कस्स बम्हणस्स।" (" Fortunately this fellow has after a long time fallen under the influence of Cupid, or, no, no,—under the influence of myself only, a Brāhmaṇa "). He was sure that after all this the hero could not retreat and that he could conduct the latter as he desired and attain his own ends through him.

At this time a conversation was going on between the girl (our heroine) and her maidservant, in which the former was defending the goddess Gaurī against the censure given to her by the maidservant for her hard heartedness and in doing so she divulged that on the previous night Gauri had appeared before her in a dream and blessed her saying that the sovereign prince of the Vidyādharas would marry her shortly. At this revelation the maidservant became very glad and said:

"भट्टिदारिए, जदि एव्वं ता किं सिविणअं इमं भणीअदि? णं हिअअत्थिदो वरो भअवदीए देवीए दिण्णो।

(" Princess, if so, then why do you call it a dream? Surely the powerful goddess has granted to you the boon that was in your heart, i.e. which you wanted with all your heart"). These words of the maidservant made clear to the hero and the Vidūṣaka the fact that the heroine was cherishing in her heart an ardent desire for having the hero as her husband. This was encouraging both to the hero and the Vidūṣaka.

The latter became anxious to usher the former immediately into the presence of the heroine, but lest the hero understood his intention and refused to go there, he took another plea saying :

"भो वअस्स, अवसरो खु एसो अम्हाणं देवीदंसणस्स। ता एहि उवसप्पन्ह।"

(" My friend, this is indeed the proper time for us to see the goddess. So, come, we shall approach "). The hero, being quite inexperienced in love-affairs, naturally felt shy and refused to enter. But the Vidūṣaka was one who would not let him off. He dragged him to the heroine's presence and said :

"सोत्थि भोदिए। भोदि, सच्चकं एव्व चदुरिआ भणादि। वरो एव्व सो देवीए दिण्णो।"

(" Hail madam : Caturikā is speaking the real truth. Here indeed is the 'वर' granted to you by the goddess "). In saying 'वर' "वरो एव्व सो देवीए दिण्णो" the Vidūṣaka practically repeated the words of the maidservant but he exhibited keen intelligence in using the word 'वर' in a double sense to mean a boon as well as a husband and thus creating a strong and permanent impression on the heroine's mind that the hero was her desired husband given to her as a boon by Gaurī.

When during the first meeting the heroine felt confused at the first dawn of love and, due to her natural perverseness, wanted to leave the place to the great disappointment of both the hero and the Vidūṣaka, the latter thought it necessary to detain her for some time by means of his wit. He struck the heroine on a very delicate point saying :

"भोदि, किं एत्थ तुम्हाणं तवोवणे ईदिसो आआरो जेण अदिही आअदो वाआमेत्तकेण वि ण संभावीअदि ?"

(" Madam, is it the usual course of conduct in your hermitage that a guest who has come is not honoured even by mere words of welcome ?"). The maidservant, who saw through the intention of the Vidūṣaka, supported the latter's complain and, on behalf of the heroine, requested

the hero to take his seat. The hero, who was anxious for an opportunity of this kind, readily complied with the maid-servant's request. At this moment a sage came there and intimated to the heroine a meassge from Kauṣika, the Chancellor, that she was to go back quickly as the time for the mid-day bath was passing away. This message disappointed both the hero and the heroine, who parted from each other with great reluctance and a heavy heart. The Vidūṣaka, who carefully noticed the mental condition of both the hero and the heroine, now became cock-sure of the success of his mission and breathed a sigh of relief. It was now time for him to look to himself.. So, he said with a light heart :

"भो दिट्ठं तुए जं पेक्खिदव्वं, सुदं जं सोदव्वं। ता दाणीं यज्झण्णसूरकिरण-संदावदिउणिदो विअ मे उदरग्गी धमधमाअदि। ता एहि णिक्कमम्ह। जेण वम्हणो अदिही भविअ मुणिजणसआसादो लद्धेहिं कन्दमूलफलेहि पि दाव पाणधारणं करेमि।"

(" Look here, Sir, you have seen what deserved seeing and you have heard what deserved hearing. Now the fire in my stomach is raging as if doubled by the burning heat of the rays of the mid-day sun. So, come; we shall go away, so that in the capacity of a Brāhmaṇa guest I may keep up my life at least with the bulbs, roots and fruits secured from the hermits ") and retired with the hero. Here ends Act I.

From the above analysis it will be evident that the Vidūṣaka, as presented in the First Act of the *Nāgānanda*, is neither a stupid nor an unimportant character. On the contrary, he has been given the most prominent part in furthering the actions of the drama. Of the remaining four Acts it is only the Second and the Third in which the Vidūṣaka re-appears, but in these two Acts he has failed to continue in the same strain. In Act II he occupies a minor position and renders practically no help in the development of the plot; and in Act III he appears as poor fun-maker lacking his natural intelligence and a refined taste.

F. 5

BHAVABHUTI—A REVALUATION

By NANDAKISHORE MISHRA

भवभूतिजलधिनिर्गतकाव्यामृतरसकणा इव स्फुरन्ति ।
कस्य विशेषा अद्यापि विकटेषु कथानिवेशेषु ॥

THUS in '*Gauḍavaho*' Vākpatirāja expresses his deep indebtedness to the ocean of Bhavabhūti's poetry. The date of this great dramatist has now been fortunately fixed and historians believe that he lived and flourished towards the close of the 7th Century A.C. in the court of Yaśovarman. This conclusion has been arrived at with the help of a verse from Kalhana's *Rajataraṅgiṇī*:

कविवाक्पतिराजश्रीभवभूत्यादिसेवितः ।
जितो ययौ यशोवर्मा तद्गणस्तुतिवन्दिताम् [1]॥

On the basis of this verse we can also conclude that Vākpatirāja was a contemporary of Bhavabhūti and they were court poets in the court of Yaśovarman, the conqueror of the Huns. This praise, coming from a contemporary and poet of the same court, clearly indicates the high honour and esteem with which Bhavabhūti must have been held in his own day. From this time till the present century the valuation of his work is a very interesting survey of changing tastes and fashions in the realm of literature.

Indian opinion gives Bhavabhūti a very high place as a poet and dramatist. It seems to have been quite consistent in this respect. After Vākpatirāja came Rājaśekhara, the author of the *Bālarāmāyaṇa*, who describes himself as an incarnation of Bhavabhūti: स्थितः पुनर्यो भवभूतिरेखया स वर्तते संप्रति राजशेखरः ।[2] This is about 900 A.C. Then we have Govardhanācārya, a contemporary of the great Jayadeva of the

[1] *Rājataraṅgiṇī* IV. 144.

[2] *Bālarāmāyaṇa* I. 16.

Gītagovinda, himself a poet of great merit, who pays a glowing tribute to the exalted language and deep pathos of the dramatist in

भवभूतेः संवन्धाद्भूधरभूरेव भारती भाति।
एतत्कृतकारुण्ये किमन्यथा रोदिति ग्रावा ॥ [3]

Kṣemendra, a great poet of Kashmir, refers to the wonderful mastery of Bhavabhūti over the metre शिखरिणी in

भवभूतेः शिखरिणी निरर्गलतरंगिणी।
रुचिरा घनसंदर्भे या मयूरीव नृत्यति ॥

Besides these eulogies a host of interesting traditions have been woven round the personality of the dramatist and have come down to us. They may not be valuable from historical standpoint, but they are invaluable in so far as they suggest a great deal about Bhavabhūti's literary excellences. One of these makes the dramatist a contemporary of Kālidāsa in the court of Bhoja, king of Dhāra, and his peer. The *Bhojaprabandha* of Ballāla gives an interesting story of how the goddess Bhuvaneśwarī intervened to vindicate the honour of Bhavabhūti, which Dr. Bhandarkar gives in the preface of his edition of the *Mālatīmādhava*. We will mention two more of these interesting anecdotes. The first of these, relates to the last line of a śloka of Bhavabhūti in the '*Uttararāmacarita*' viz., अविदितगतयामारात्रिरेवं व्यरंसीत् [4]. Kālidāsa is supposed to have appreciated the fine sentiment evoked in this verse and suggested an improvement by removing the अनुस्वार in एवं and reading it as रात्रिरेव व्यरंसीत् . This is a beautiful story which ingeneously suggests Kālidāsa's mastery over ध्वनि, which indeed is the soul of his poetry. In the second, which is widely prevalent in Orissa, there is an allusion to the supposed poverty of Bhavabhūti, and his superior poetic merit. It is said that Bhavabhūti was one

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[3] *Āryāsaptaśatī*. I. 36

[4] *U. C.* I. 27.

day weaving a mat in his cottage on the bank of a river. The shades of evening were gathering and at this time Kālidāsa, by a stroke of porpitious chance, came upon him. He did not know the identity of the great dramatist. They, in course of their talk, referred to the Cakravākas in the river. Kālidāsa described the plight of one of them at the advent of night in

आयाति याति पुनरेव जलं प्रयाति
पद्माङ्कुराणि विचिनोति धुनोति पक्षौ ।
उन्मत्तवद्भ्रमति कूजति रुद्धकण्ठः
कान्तावियोगविधुरो निशि चक्रवाकः[5] ॥

Bhavabhūti is said to have described the same sense in :

भङ्क्त्वा भीतो न भुङ्क्ते कुटिलबिसलताखंडमिन्दोर्वितर्कात्
ताराकारात्तृषार्तो न पिबति पयसां विप्लुषः पद्मसंस्थाः ।
छायामंभोजिनीनामलिकुलशबलां वीक्ष्य संध्यामसंध्यां
कान्ताविच्छेदभीरुर्दिनमपि रजनीं मन्यते चक्रवाकः ॥

These anecdotes, which prove nothing historically, are very valuable in so far as they reflect the different shades of opinion prevalent in India, regarding the excellence of Bhavabhūti as a poet, and the qualities of his poetry.

Two conclusions can be clearly drawn from this. One school of thought considered Kālidāsa to be a greater poet by virtue of his command over ध्वनि or the suggestive power of his poetry and the other preferred Bhavabhūti for the majesty of his lines and the strikingness (चमत्कारिता) of his descriptions.

With the advent of the 19th century, the fate of our Sanskrit classics underwent a great change, revolutionary in character, which has ultimately led to the stabilization of opinion regarding the estimate of many of our poets, at the present day. The eager interest with which scholars, like

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[5] Vide *Vidyākarasahasrakam*, p. 30.

[6] This verse is attributed to Lakhimā Ṭhākurāṇī, the queen patroness of the Maithila poet Vidyāpati, Vide *Ibid*.

Sir William Jones, Dr. Max Müller, Prof. Winternitz, and last but not least Prof. H.H. Wilson plunged themselves in the study of Sanskrit literature, is perhaps unsurpassed in the world of letters. This interest of the west has indeed gone a long way to vitalise, to illuminate and to give an impetus to the study of the literature of our ancient land. We will be certainly failing in our duty if we do not acknowledge our debt to these savants who were actuated by a sheer love of learning, for its own sake, to probe the mysteries of India's literature and philosophy. We pay our homage to them, but we find that their judgments raise controversies which are yet to be solved.

Thus Bhavabhūti has not been properly appreciated by western scholars. They have not only been more sparing, than the dramatist's Indian critics, in their praise of him, but they have passed judgments which not only damage his reputation to some extent, but create misconceptions about the literary value of his works.

The most important of these, which have tremendously influenced the Indian scholars of the present day, are the remarks of Prof. Wilson. In his study of the Sanskrit Drama he makes some obserations which do scant justice to Bhavabhūti. He, of course, brings into light many of his excellences. But they are, unfortunately, obliterated by the unfavourable character of his judgments, in general. We will quote here the most significant of these.—

"There is more passion in the thoughts of Bhavabhūti than in those of Kālidāsa, but less fancy. There are few of the elegant similitudes in which the latter is so rich and there is more that is common place, and much that is strained and obscure. In none of his dramas does Bhavabhūti make any attempt at wit, we have no character in either of his three dramas approaching the Viduṣaka. On the other hand he expatiates more largely in the description of human emotions and is perhaps entitled to even a higher place than his rival, as a poet.'

This observation has to a very great extent influenced the judgment of such eminent Indian scholars as Dr. Bhandar-

kar and Dr. Todar Mall whose services to the advancement of Sanskrit learning and culture wil be gratefully remembered, as long as our culture lasts. The former in his introduction to the *Mīlatīmādhava.* institutes a comparison between Kālidāsa and Bhavabhūti and points out "the former (Kālidāsa) suggests or indicates the sentiment which the latter (Bhavabhūti) expresses in forcible language." He further goes on to say "Kālidāsa has more fancy, greater art, more skill in suggesting. Bhāvabhūti has originality in plot and conception but no skill in the arrangement of incidents and in denouement". Dr. Todar Mall finds fault with the dramatist for his lack of humour in these words:

"His three plays are characterised by the absence of the figure of the Vidūṣaka, who plays so important a part in all the three dramas of Kālidāsa. Bhavabnūti loves earnestness. He likes to be serious to a remarkable degree, so much so that not a single instance of a hearty joke or a flash of wit is to be met with in any of his three works."

These criticisms, taken on the whole, are reducible to a few significant points. Almost all the critics of the dramatist, from Prof. Wilson downwards, have always Kālidāsa in mind when thinking of Bhavabhūti. There is a tendency to a remarkable degree of judging the dramatist from the point of view of qualities that he has not, rather than from those in which he excels. Another point worth noticing is that his professions about his own art like his conception of the drama, have hardly been taken into consideration.

In his '*Mālatīmādhava*', Bhavabhūti speaks of his own work with a calm confidence, which with its unmistakable note of sneer towards his critics, takes his readers by surprise. It speaks volumes about the temperament of the young dramatist who looked for appreciation in the dim and distant future, if not in his own time, and was sure of it:—

ये नाम केचिदिह नः प्रथयन्त्यवज्ञां
जानन्ति ते किमपि तान् प्रति नैष यत्नः।

उत्पस्यते मम तु कोऽपि समानधर्मा
कालो ह्ययं निरवधिर्विपुला च पृथ्वी ॥[6]

In the very next verse, he clarifies his position by stating in unequivocal terms his own conception of the art of drama—

यद्वेदाध्ययनं तथोपनिषदां सांख्यस्य योगस्य च
ज्ञानं तत्कथनेन किं न हि ततः कश्चिद्गुणो नाटके।
यत्प्रौढत्वमुदारता च वचसां यच्चार्थतो गौरवं
तच्चेदस्ति ततस्तदेव गमक पाण्डित्यवैदग्ध्ययोः ॥[7]

"What is the use of talking about the study of the Vedas, and likewise the knowledge of the Upaniṣads, the Sāṅkhya and the Yoga? For there arises no merit of any kind from them in a drama. If there exists, what is known as dignity and felicity of expression and depth of meaning, that alone is indicative of scholarship and genius".

Earlier in the प्रस्तावना of the same play, through the नट the dramatist observes:

भूम्ना रसानां गहनाः प्रयोगाः सौहार्दहृद्यानि विचेष्टितानि।
औद्धत्यमायोजितकामसूत्रं चित्राः कथा वाचि विदग्धता च ॥[8]

"Profound representations characterised by the excess of sentiments, actions attractive owing to affection, boldness indicative of course of love set into motion, wonderful plots, and profoundity of speech," as the merits of good प्रबन्ध. By प्रबन्ध he necessarily means a नाटक ; and these as well are the characteristics of his art as a dramatist.

Any valuation of Bhavabhūti which does not take into consideration these aspects of his art, which he considered to be his ideals in literature, will be unconvincing and unfair. We have to see how far he succeeds in living up to his ideals.

The dramatist considered himself to be वश्यवाक् "The master of Speech". He describes '*Mahāvīracarita*' as "वश्यवाचः कवेः काव्यम्". His emphasis on an exalted style is clear from the verses quoted above from he '*Mālatīmādhava*', In *Uttararā-*

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[6] *Mālatīmādhava* I. 6

[7] *Ibid* I. 7.

[8] *Ibid* I. 4.

macarita the poet delivers himself with a nonchalance, which reminds us of Upendra Bhañja, the premier-poet of Orissa:

यं ब्रह्माणमियं देवी वाग्वश्येवानुवर्तते।
उत्तरं रामचरितं तत्प्रणीतं प्रयुज्यते ॥[9]

In the भरतवाक्य of the same play he described himself as 'शब्दब्रह्मविद्'. This mastery over words becomes patent when we take into consideration the wonderful variety of Bhavabhūti's style. He could use all the styles like वैदर्भी, पांचाली and गौड़ी with equal felicity and ease. The following three ślokas beautifully illustrate this:

अस्मिन्नेव लतागृहे त्वमभवस्तन्मार्गदत्तेक्षणः
सा हंसैः कृतकौतुका चिरमभूद्गोदावरीसैकते।
आयान्त्या परिदुर्मनायितमिव त्वां वीक्ष्य बद्धस्तया
कातर्यादरविन्दकुड्मलनिभो मुग्धः प्रणामाञ्जलिः[10]॥

श्रमाम्बुशिशिरीभवत्प्रसृतमन्दमन्दाकिनी-
मरुत्तरलितालकाकुलललाटचन्द्रद्युति।
अकुंकुमकलंकितोज्ज्वलकपोलमुत्प्रेक्ष्यते
निराभरणसुन्दरश्रवणपाशमुग्धं मुखम्[11]॥

कण्डूलद्विपगण्डपिण्डकषणोत्कम्पेन संपातिभिः
घर्मस्रंसितबन्धनैः स्वकुसुमैरर्चन्ति गोदावरीम्।
छायापष्किरमाणविष्किरमुखव्याकृष्टकीटत्वचः
कूजत्क्लान्तकपोतकुक्कुटकुलाः कूले कुलायद्रुमाः[12]॥

Of illustrations there cannot be any end. Bhavabhūti's greatness can also be perceived, when we mark his fine sense choice in the matter of style and metre. His favourite metre was, of course, शिखरिणी, but he uses the most appropriate metres and styles to suit sentiments and situations, which are thus considerably enhanced with feeling and grandeur.

His treatment of Nature, which demands a seperate treatment, gives us a clue to his heart. Here he often

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[9] *Uttararāmacarita*. I. 2
[10] *Ibid.* III. 37.
[11] *Ibid.* VI. 37.
[12] *Ibid.* II. 9.

surpasses Kālidāsa. There is no doubt that from Kālidāsa he learnt much. But here is one of those fine instances where the pupil excels his master. There are numerous examples of his delineation of nature in the Kālidāsian style, such as—

स्थितमुपनतजृम्भागर्भविम्बैः कदम्बैः
कृतमविकलकण्ठैस्ताण्डवं नीलकण्ठैः।
उपरिविघटमानप्रौढतापिच्छनीलः
श्रयति शिखरमद्रेर्नूतनस्तोयवाहः[13]॥

असौ विद्याशाली शिशुरपि विनिर्गत्य भवना-
दिहायातः संप्रत्यविकलशरच्चन्द्रवदनः।
यदालोकस्थाने भवति पुरमुन्मादतरलैः
कटाक्षैर्नारीणां कुवलयितवातायनमिव[14]॥

किशलयमिव मुग्धं बंधनाद्विप्रलूनं
हृदयकुसुमशोषी दारुणो दीर्घशोकः।
ग्लपयति परिपाण्डु क्षाममस्याः शरीरं
शरदिज इव घर्मः केतकीगर्भपत्रम्[15]॥

But the greatness of Bhavabhūti lies in visualising the grand and terrible in Nature. Probably the blue mountains and gurgling streams of central India, in the midst of which he had passed his childhood, had left an indelible impression on his mind and he celebrated them in his poetry. Probably it was his temperament which made him see Nature red in toothand claw. Whatever the reasons may be, he often summons Nature in its terrific aspects to develop the रौद्र and वीभत्स and भयानक Rasas in his dramas. The description of the cremation ground with its attendant horrors creates an atmosphere perhaps unparalleled in the whole range of Sanskrit drama, in the *Mālatīmādhava*:

कूजत्कुञ्जकुटीरकौशिकघटाघूत्कारसंवलित-
क्रन्दत्फेरवचण्डडात्कृतिभृतप्राग्भारभीमैस्तटैः।

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[13] *Mahāvīracarita* V. 42.
[14] *Mālatimādhava*. II. 11.
[15] *Uttararāmacarita*. III. 5

अन्तः शीर्णकरङ्ककर्करपयः संरोधकूलंकष-
स्रोतोनिर्गमघोरघर्घररवा पारेश्मशानं सरित् [16]॥

All this is in keeping with the state of the hero's mind. We can aptly compare the horror of this scene with that in the scene of Duncan's murder in Shakespeare's '*Macbeth*'.

The descriptio of the दण्डकारण्य in the *Uttararāmacarita* is never forgotten by any one who has ever gone through it. The dramatist describes the forests of Central India at the height of summer when lizards quench their thirst by drinking the sweat of pythons in—

निष्कूजस्तिमिताः क्वचित्क्वचिदपि प्रोच्चण्डसत्त्वस्वनाः
स्वेच्छासुप्तगभीरभोगभुजगश्वासप्रदीप्ताग्नयः।
सीमानः प्रदरोदरेषु विलसत्स्वल्पाम्भसो यास्वयं
तृष्यद्भिः प्रतिसूर्यकैरजगरस्वेदद्रवः पीयते[17]॥

As a picturesque background he introduces the blue cloud-capped mountains and swift-flowing streams falling into the seas in the midst of which he spent his childhood, in

एते ते कुहरेषु गद्गदनदद्गोदावरीवारयो
मेघालम्बितमौलिनीलशिखराः क्षोणीभृतो दक्षिणाः।
अन्योन्यप्रतिघातसंकुलचलत्कल्लोलकोलाहलै-
रुत्तालास्त इमे गभीरपयसः पुण्याः सरित्संगमाः॥[18]

Grand descriptions of Nature such as these, are hardly to be found any where in the whole range of Sanskrit literature, except in Bāṇa. The only instance in Kālidāsa, is, of course, his descriptoin of the Himālayas in the *Kumāra-Smabhava*. And here Bhavabhūti certainly equals him. As Mr. A. Barooah rightly observes:

"It will be conceded by the most fastidious critic that their author, with all his faults, was a great poet with lofty genius excelling alike in moving the heart by depicting tender emotions and rivetting attention by describing in noble language what is grand and terrific in nature."

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16 *Mālatīmādhava* V. 19.
17 *Uttararāmacarita*. II. 16.
18 *Ibid* II. 30.

But Bhavabhūti is a great poet, not because he knew how to paint Naure in her grand or terrific aspects, but because he is primarily a poet of Man. It is thus that he comes nearest to our hearts. Here he excels Kālidāsa, whom he leaves miles behind. Prof. Wilson rightly observes: "He expatiates more largely in the description of human emotions and is perhaps entitled to even a higher place than his rival, as a poet." This, of course, is said with some mental reservations. But this is the truth. The way Bhavabhūti analyses the human heart, can be easily seen in his masterpiece, *Uttararāmacarita*, where Rāma is put to the severe test of choosing between love and duty. The tragic conflict which Bhavabhūti portrays in the First Act, after Durmukha has informed Rāma about the opinion of the public regarding Sītā's purity, is indeed without a parallel in the whole range of Sanskrit literature. It reminds us of some passages in Shakespeare's '*Othello*', when the hero cannot persuade himself to believe in Desdemona's fall, and tear his heart away from her. Rāma is thus placed in the crucible of playing the good king at the cost of sacrificing his loving and devoted wife. He thinks of himself as nothing short of an assassin who sends away his wife, the ornament of his home, as a prey to wild animals, who in her implicit confidence had gone to sleep on his breast, in her advanced state of pregnancy. It would be difficult to find a more tragic and heart rendering situation in the dramatic literature of the world. After this the dramatist takes Rāma to Daṇḍakāraṇya, where he had spent the happiest years of his youth with his young wife, now considered to be dead. Here Rāma's lacerated heart overflows at the sight of the dear old scenes which are full of the tenderest associations. There too he ultimately comes upon his two heroic sons, and the scene of the union at the end is one of the glories of our Sanskrit literature, in its delicacy of restraint, solemnity and beauty .

All this is due to Bhavabhūti's originality of conception in the sphere of dramatic art. The older exponents

of the theory of poetry had said that drama must have either of the two Rasas वीर and शृंगार as its अंगीरस; ; "वीरशृंगारयोरेकः" But Bhavabhūti with his wonderful daring departed from this time-honoured principle and gave करुणरस the pride of place in dramatic art. His whole point of view is put forth in

एको रसः करुण एव निमित्तभेदा-
द्भिन्नः पृथक्पृथगिवाश्रयते विवर्तान् ।
आवर्तबुद्बुदतरंगमयान् विकारा-
नम्भो यथा सलिलमेव तु तत्समग्रम्[19] ॥

"The one sentiment of pathos, divided by a diversity of causes, undergoes different variations, as water assumes the different conditions of eddies, bubbles and waves; and it is all, nevertheless but water." If we do not appreciate this stand of the dramatist we would be missing the whole point of his dramas. The greatest contribution of Sanskrit to world literature is its Rasa-theory of poetry. If we analyse Bhavabhūti's *Mālatīmādhava* and particularly his *Uttararāmacarita*, we will find how beautifully he lives up to his ideals which he set forth for himself in the realm of drama. In the latter drama, undoubtedly his masterpiece, the करुणरस is developed by the आलम्बन and उद्दीपन vibhāvas strictly in accordance with the canons of poetic art laid down in treatises like the *Kāvyaprakāśa* and *Sāhityadarpaṇa*. How this is accomplished will, of course, cover a long discussion, as it demands separate treatment altogether. In *Uttararāmacarita* the poet describes Sītā, as "करुणस्य मूर्तिरथवा शरीरिणी". This may be said to be an apt description of his poetic genius.The appreciation of Indian scholars, of this aspect of his art, has been beautifully summed up in"कारुण्यं भवभूतिरेव तनुते".

Once we appreciate Bhavabhūti's preference of the करुणरस it becomes easy to answer the charge of deficiency of the poet in humour. Prof. Wilson's remark that "In none

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[19] *Uttararāmacarita*. III. 47.

of his dramas does Bhavabhūti make any attempt at wit, and we have no character in either of his three dramas approaching the Vidūṣaka", loses all significance. Our masters of the theory of Poetry with their wonderful psychological approach considered करुणरस as a विरोधी of हास्यरस. Thus Viśwanātha defining करुणरस as—

इष्टनाशादनिष्टाप्तेः करुणाख्यो रसो भवेत्।
धीरैः कपोतवर्णोऽयं कथितो यमदैवतः[20]।

goes on to say that

भयानकेन करुणेनापि हास्यो विरोधभाक्।
करुणो हास्यशृंगाररसाभ्यामपि तादृशः[21]॥

Some people seem to think that since Kālidāsa has a Vidūṣaka in each of his dramas, every dramatist must have one in his play. If he does not have one his drama is not good. Nothing could be more ridiculous. Bhavabhūti seems to have deliberately excluded the professional clown from his dramas. He has absolutely no place there. This speaks volumes about his superior poetic talent and how he was discerning in his choice of characters. If he had introduced the Vidūṣaka in his *Uttararāmcarita*, he would have played the same part as that of the clown in Shakespear's "*Othello*".

The choice of the करुणरस as the main sentiment for his dramas accounts for the moving realism of Bhavabhūti's art. The picture of a happy home which he draws in his masterpiece is never forgotten. The happy relationship existing between the two "Sambandhīs" Janaka and Daśaratha, which the former expresses in "कन्यायाः किल पूजयन्ति पितरो जामातुराप्तं जनम्"[22] and स संबन्धी श्लाघ्यः प्रियसुहृदसौ तच्च हृदयम्"[23] shows his profound knowledge of the ways of the world. He defines love as:—

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[20] *Sāhityadarpaṇa*. III. 222.
[21] Ibid. III. 255.
[22] U. C. IV. 17
[23] Ibid. IV. 13

अद्वैतं सुखदःखयोरनुगुणं सर्वास्ववस्थासुयद्-
विश्रामो हृदयस्य यत्र जरसा यस्मिन्नहार्यो रसः।
कालेनावरणात्ययात्परिणते यत्स्नेहसारे स्थितं
भद्रं तस्य सुमानुषस्य कथमप्येकं हि तत्प्राप्यते ॥[24]

"That one thing, which a happy and fortunate man obtains, which is the same in happiness or misery, which adapts itself to all conditions, where the heart finds its solace, the flavour of which is unaffected by old age, which matures, as time removes the veil into permanent and deep affection."

This is in keeping with our noblest traditions of which India is justly proud. Bhavabhūti's poetry is, like the poetry of Kālidāsa, the poetry of ideals, which are strewn all over his works. They create the sublime effect and elevate our heart from the humdrum commonplaces of our existence. The passage quoted above reminds one of Milton's noble lines beginning with 'Hail, Wedded Love' in *Paradise Lost*. Like Wordsworth's *Skylark* the poet was "true to the kindred points of heaven and home." The noblest of these sentiments is however expressed when Bhavabhūti speaks of a child as—

अन्तःकरणतत्त्वस्य दम्पत्योः स्नेहसंश्रयात्।
आनन्दग्रन्थिरेकोऽयमपत्यमिति वध्यते ॥[25]

"The one knot of joy that unites the principles of the hearts of the husband and wife, one account of its being the abode of their affections". Here we find a union of sublimity and tenderness. We can compare the scene of Rāma's union with his wife and sons with that of Duṣyanta with Sakuntalā and Bharata. Bhavabhūti might have modelled his scene on the corresponding scene in the "*Śākuntalam*" but in the depth of feeling and tenderness of sentiments he excels Kālidāsa. The refinement delicacy and fine restraint which our dramatist exhibits here is one of the glories of

[24] *Uttararāmacarita* I. 39.
[25] *Ibid.* III. 17.

Sanskrit Literature. It brings tears of joy to the eyes of readers and audience alike, to see Sītā having a sight of her long-lost father and her two sons at the same time, and though united with Rāma, after passing through so many trials and tribulations, only thinking within herself "My lord knows how to wipe away Sītā's sorrow" ("जानाति आर्यपुत्रः सीतायाः दुःखं परिमार्ष्टुम्"). Not even a single syllable addressed to Rāma escapes her lips. Comparing this scene with Kālidāsa's in the 7th Act of the *Śākuntalam*, where the king falls at the feet of Śakuntalā and rises when Śakuntalā says :

अय कथमार्यपुत्रेण स्मृतो दुःखभागी अयं जनः।
राजा--उद्धृतविषादशल्यः कथयिष्यामि।
मोहान्मया सुतनु पूर्वमुपेक्षितस्ते
यो वाष्पविन्दुरधरं परिवाधमानः।
तं तावदाकुटिलपक्ष्मविलग्नमद्य
कान्ते प्रमृज्य विगतानुशयो भवामि[26]॥
(यथोक्तमनुतिष्ठति)

we always feel that Bhavabhūti's view of life is more realistic and "felt in the blood, and felt along the heart."

The Sanskrit drama is essentially poetic. It is through this medium that our poets expressed their view of life. Lascelles Abercrombie, speaking of the function of poetry in the drama said "Poetry-drama, however, except only for preserving the necessary credibility, neglects the outer shells of reality, and directly seeks to imitate the core." He further observed "Dramatic poetry is to experience as wine is to the grape". It is only through poetry that drama can almost "intoxicate men to be consciously and delightedly in love with life itself, yes, even with the tragedy of life". It is only to this type that Bhavabhūti's dramas can be properly said to belong. They are in the same line as Euripides's lyrical tragedies. His view of life was perhaps a tragic one beautifully transmuted by the Vedantic philosophy in which he must have been profoundly interested.

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[26] *Śākuntalam*. VII. 25.

But that does not mean that he lacked the sense of the dramatist. In managing dramatic situations he shows himself a clever artist. The situation he creates for Sītā's exile in the first Act of the *Uttararāmacarita* is a wonderful piece of art. Rāma is left alone with Sītā lying asleep with his arm for her pillow and it is in this state that Durmukha breaks the evil tidings. But the most stricking of these instances, which brings into light Bhavabhūti's wonderful power of dramatic inventiveness, is the beautiful 'play' within a play which turns the tragic end of the *Rāmāyaṇa* into a happy comedy, that is the *Uttararāmacarita*. This reminds us of the 'play within a play' in Shakespeare's '*Hamlet.*' It is as powerful and as ingenuous in bringing out the feelings of Rāma which overflow at the sight of Sītā's sufferings, while he considers himself as their cruel author. The best instance of Bhavabhūti's skill in constructing the plot of his dramas is certainly his '*Mālatīmādhava*'. It is all his own; it has a beauty almost architectural, in the matter of its design. Hence, Dhanapāla in his *Tilakamañjarī* said—

स्पष्टभावरसा चित्रैः पदन्यासैः प्रवर्तिता।
नाटकेषु नटस्त्रीव भारती भवभूतिना[27]॥

In conclusion, it can be said that the opinion of the Indian scholars indicates a more correct approach to Bhavabhūti's art. Their observations are based on a sound analysis and are amply borne out by the dramatist's excellences in the various aspects of his art. They are more valuable because they are based on a more appreciative approach, without any prejudice or mental reservation. Many European scholars also share their point of view, we will end with the following observation of Elphinstone:

"The best dramatic authors are Kālidāsa and Bhababhūti. The first excels in tenderness and delicacy and is full of highly poetical descriptions. The other great dramatist possesses all the same qualities in an equal degree, accompanied by a sublimity of description, a manly tone, and a high and even martial spirit, that is without example in any other Hindu poet that I have heard of."

[27] Introd. Verse. 30.

THE CONCEPTION OF ACTION AMONG THE VAIYĀKARAṆAS

By K. A. Subramania Iyer

It is the view of the Vaiyākaranas that both the sentence and its meaning are indivisible units and the only real units of speech. Words and their meanings, like roots and suffixes within the words, have no ultimate reality. We get words and word-meanings by an artificial analysis of the sentence and the sentence-meaning. The cognition of the individual word and its meaning is really an illusion (विभ्रम).[1] The analysis of the really unanalysable sentence is a means of understanding it and explaining it, just as the division of the really indivisible word into root and affix is a means of explaining it. Sentences are infinite in number and no two sentences are absolutely identical. When we analyse the sentences into words, we find that the same word seems to recur in many sentences. But this sense of identity is deceptive. It is due to the similarity in the movements of the vocal organs required for the pronounciation of the apparently same word in the different sentences. In reality, it is not the same word at all. Parts of different sentences cannot be the same, because the wholes of which they are parts are different from one another. Another point in this artificial analysis of sentences into words or of words into roots and affixes is that there is no fixity about it. Some see in a Sanskrit sentence two kinds of words, others four and others still five.[2]

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1 वाक्यस्यैव निरंशस्य वाचकत्वादन्तरां पदप्रतिपत्तिर्विभ्रम इति किमसत्यपदव्युत्पादनेनेत्याशंक्यापोद्धृत्यैव वाक्येभ्य इत्याह। Helārāja on *Vāk*. III. जा verse. 1.

2 द्विधा कैश्चित् पदं भिन्नं चतुर्धा पंचधापि वा। अपोद्धृत्यैव वाक्येभ्यः प्रकृतिप्रत्ययादिवत्॥ *Vāk*. III. जा verse. 1.

The different schools of Sanskrit Grammar do not analyse a Sanskrit word like 'भवति' into the same component parts and it is not possible to maintain that one of them is right and the others wrong. Roots and affixes not being real, but only artificial parts of a word, it is only a matter of convenience as to how the word should be split up into parts. It is true that the parts of a word have to correspond to the parts of word-meaning which are equally unreal; but it sometimes happens that due to certain conventions, some schools of grammar divide a word into more parts than there are in its meaning. With all that, the division of word-meaning into parts acts as a kind of check on the division of the word itself. Similarly, it is the division of the meaning of a sentence which regulates the division of the sentence itself[3] Words and sentences, if divided at all, have to be divided into meaningful parts.

According to Sanskrit Grammarians, when a sentence is thus artificially analysed, it is found to consist of two main parts one part expressive of क्रिया or sādhya and the other part expressive of Kāraka or siddha, the former being called verb (आख्यात) and the latter 'noun' (नामन्). A modern linguist would say that a word or a sentence can be analysed into two parts, semanthemes and morphemes, elements which express certain fundamental notions and elements which express certain others, which modify them, the grammatical categories. In the analysis of the Vaiyākaraṇas, the part which expresses क्रिया is the more important of the two and it is, therefore, very important to get a clear idea of क्रिया as expressed by a verb. Similarly, when a word (be it a noun or verb) is analysed into root and affix, the question arises as to what is the meaning of each. Or the question might arise in another way. One might want

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[3] अर्थापोद्धार एव हि पदापोद्धारस्य निमित्तम्। अनिमित्ते हि तस्मिन् वर्णापोद्धारस्यापि प्रसंगात् तेषामपि व्यूत्पाद्यता स्यात्। Helārāja on *Vāk*. III. जा verse 1.

to know how to tell a root from what is not a root and if the answer is that the root is that which expresses क्रिया, it becomes necessary to get a clear idea of क्रिया as expressed by a root. In answering such questions, Bhartṛhari has not only made full use of certain ideas found in the *Nirukta* of Yāska, in the *Vārttikas* of Kātyāyana and the *Bhāṣya* of Patañjali, but has also shown the influence that philosophy, from the Vedic times to his day, has had on grammatical speculations in India.

To begin with Yāska. Of the two words भाव and क्रिया which occur so frequently in this context, it is the former which Yāska has used in the *Nirukta*. He says that a verb primarily denotes 'भाव' which is thus distinguished from सत्त्व which is the meaning of a noun.[4] He also quotes the view of Vārṣyāyaṇi that भाव undergoes six modifications: genesis, existence, alteration, growth, decay and destruction.[5] There was obviously some uncertainty as to what Yāska meant by भाव. His commentator Durgācārya gives two alternative explanations. It is difficult to say to what extent Durgācārya faithfully gives us the ideas meant to be expressed by Yāska in his all too brief statements. The distance between the two is far too great. However, it will not be out of place to state here briefly what ideas of Bhāva were current among students of the *Nirukta* in the old days. According to one conception of Bhāva, it is different from क्रिया. It is manifested by the latter. क्रिया comes into being for the sake of भाव. If क्रिया means action, भाव is an ultimate condition brought about by that action. Action in invisible, but we infer its existence from the भाव or the particular condition or state brought about

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4 तत्रैतन्नामाख्यातयोर्लक्षणं प्रदिशन्ति भावप्रधानमाख्यातम् सत्त्वप्रधानानि नामानि। *Nirukta* I. 1.9. (Pt. Siva Datt's Edition)

5 षड् भावविकारा भवन्तीति वार्ष्यायणिर्जायतेऽस्ति विपरिणमते वर्धतेऽपक्षीयते विनश्यतीति *Nirukta*. I. 2. 8.

by it. That is why क्रिया is the secondary meaning of a verb, as compared with भाव which is its primary meaning (भावप्रधान). A thing is subordinate to that for the sake of which it comes into being. क्रिया comes into being for the sake of भाव. Hence, it is subordinate to it. To say that the root पच् means भाव is equal to saying that it stands for that particular state or condition of a substance like rice which is brought about by the action called cooking. This action has various aspects, each of which is associated with one of the accessories of action (Kārakas) and which are expressed by the different nouns which are present, together with the verb, in the same sentence. क्रिया is a process and भाव is the result of that process and though both are expressed by the verb, it is the latter which is its main meaning.[6]

This is one view of भाव. The other view is that it is the process itself. No distinction is made in this view between the process and the result of the process. The verb expresses this process as its main meaning. It is, in reality, the meaning of the root part of the verb. The affixes express the accessories such as agent, object etc. of this process, but they are all subordinate to the process expressed by the root.[7] It is called a process because it has parts arranged in a temporal sequence (पूर्वापरीभूत).[8]

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6 नामपदवाच्यार्थाश्रयक्रियाव्यङ्ग्यो भावः पाकरागत्यागाख्यः। स यत्र प्रधान गुणभूता क्रिया तादिदं भावप्रधानम्। किं पुनस्तदिति। आख्यातम्। आख्यायतेऽनेन गुणभावेन वर्तमाना अनेककारकप्रविभक्ता स्फुरमाणेव प्रधानद्रव्यभावाभिव्यक्त्युन्मुखीभूता क्रिया तस्याश्च प्राधान्येन वर्तमानो भावः स्वात्मलाभप्रधान इत्याख्यातम्।—दुर्गाचार्य on *Nirukta* I. 1. 9.

7 एके पुनर्भावप्रधानमाख्यातमिति प्रकृत्यर्थप्रधानमिति मन्यन्ते। प्रकृत्यर्थविशेषणं हि प्रत्ययार्थादय इति। भावः कर्म क्रिया धात्वर्थः इत्यनर्थान्तरम्। स यत्र प्रधानम् गुणभूतानि साधनानि तदिदं भावप्रधानम्। किं पुनस्तत्। आख्यातम्।—दुर्गाचार्य on *Nirukta* I.2.7.

8 पूर्वापरीभूतं भावमाख्यातेनाचष्टे व्रजति पचतीत्युपक्रमप्रभृत्यपवर्गपर्यन्तम्।—*Nirukta* I.1.11.

Whether भाव be the result of a process or the process itself, it is an effect.[9] In addition to this भाव, there is an eternal bhāva of which all processes are transformations. Not only all processes, but all substances and qualities too, in fact, everything which is expressed by the four kinds of words.[10] Yāska, quoting Vārṣyāyaṇi, speaks particularly of action or processes which are transformations of this भाव or Being: There are six such transformations under which all processes can be brought. They are: Genesis, Existence, Alteration, Growth, Decay and Destruction, expresed by the words: जायते अस्ति विपरिणमते वर्धते अपक्षीयते and विनश्यति.[11] Each one of these words openly expresses only one distinctive process and not anything else which may be implied in it. Only that which 'is' can be born and yet the verb jāyate denotes only genesis and not existence which may be implied in it.

Durgācārya is a comparatively late writer and in interpreting the ideas of Yāska, he may have been influenced by speculations in grammatical circles from Patañjali to Bhartṛhari. And yet, if we try to interpret Yāska without reference to the commentary we would not be able to extract much in the way of ideas from the all too brief statements which he makes.

To Patañjali, the problem presented itself in the following way: How to tell a root from what is not a root? It was necessary to adopt a criterion which would exclude (1) Sanskrit words which had the same sound as roots but

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9 तयोर्यः कार्यात्मा तगधिकृत्योक्तम्-क्रियानिर्वर्त्यो योऽर्थः स भावः, क्रियैव वा भावः इति।—दुर्गाचार्य on *Nirukta* I.2.7.

10 तद्विकारा एव हि द्रव्यगुणकर्मभावेनावस्थिताः सन्तो नामाख्यातोपसर्गनिपातै-रभिधीयन्ते।—दुर्गाचार्य on *Nirukta* I. 2. 7.

11 षड् भावविकारा भवन्तीति वार्ष्यायणिर्जायतेऽस्ति विपरिणमते वर्धतेऽपक्षीयते विनश्यतीति। *Nirukta* on I. 2. 8

which were not roots,[12] (2) prefixes and suffixes which had meanings very allied to those of roots, (3) and Prākṛt roots which had the same meaning as the corresponding Sanskrit roots. Patañjali realised the need to adopt a double test: (1) that of inclusion or mention in certain approved lists or texts such as the *Dhātupāṭha*, the *Sūtras*, the *Vārttikas*, *Bhāṣya* and *Gaṇapāṭha*, and (2) that of meaning. We are interested in this second test. He presents this test in two forms. At first he says that the root is that which expresses a क्रिया, an action. All roots express it. That is why a verb formed from any root can be used in answer to the question: किं करोति. The meanings of all roots are mere variations of the meaning of the root कृ i.e. action in general.[13] Actions or movements inhere in something or other and it may be held that there is no such thing as action or movement apart from the thing in which it inheres. When we say, for instance, that Devadatta goes, is there such a thing as his 'going' apart from his presence at different points of space, from the starting place to the destination? Patañjali holds that there is. Devadatta, his starting point and the place of destination all these may be present at a certain moment and yet we may not be able to use the expression: 'Devadatta goes'. At another moment we may actually use the above expression. Obviously some new factor must have then come in which justified our use of the expression 'Devadatta goes.' That new factor is action. To put it in another way: We have to explain the fact that Devadatta is now here and is at another place sometime later. To ex-

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[12] पाठेन धातुसंज्ञायां समानशब्दप्रतिषेधः। *Vār*. on *Pāṇini Sūtra* I. 3. 1.

[13] (a) क्रियावचनो धातुरित्येतल्लक्षणं क्रियेत। *Bhāṣya* on I 3. 1.

(b) कथं पुनर्ज्ञायते क्रियावचनाः पचादय इति। यदेतेषां करोतिना सामानाधिकरण्यम्। किं करोति ? पचति। किं करिष्यति ? पक्ष्यति। किमकार्षीत् ? अपाक्षीत्। *Bhāṣya* on I. 3. 11.

plain this, we postulate the action of going which Devadatta performed. We infer that he performed the action of going from the effect of that action, namely, the fact of his being found at another place. That means that action is not directly perceptible. It is something which has to be inferred from its effetcs.[14] It is the root which expresses this action and not prefixes and suffixes which are added to it to form the word and which express other ideas which qualify or modify the action expressed by the root. Sometimes a root, in association with a particular prefix, seems to express an action which is the very opposite of what it usually expresses. But, even there, it is simple to assume that the root itself expresses the new meaning. Roots are polysemic and there is no bar to a root expressing several widely different notions.

The idea that action of some kind or other is the meaning of a root seems to encounter a difficulty in the case of some roots. It was given as a proof of this notion that a verb formed from any root can be used in answer to the question किं करोति। But the roots अस्, भू and विद् do not seem to follow this principle. Nobody ever seems to say अस्ति or भवति or विद्यते in answer to the question किं करोति। The meanings of these roots do not seem to be variations of action in general which is the meaning of the root कृ. And yet it would go against the facts of the Sanskrit language to deny the name of root to अस्, भू and विद्.[15] Secondly, it is said about क्रिया that the notion of it sometimes arises and sometimes does not even though its accessories may have always been present.

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14 इह सर्वेषु साधनेषु सन्निहितेषु कदाचित् पचतीत्येतद् भवति कदाचिन्न भवति। यस्मिन् सन्निहिते पचतीत्येतद् भवति सा नूनं क्रिया। अथवा यया देवदत्त इह भूत्वा पाटलिपुत्रे भवति सा नूनं क्रिया।—भाष्य on *Pāṇini sūtra* I. 3. 1.

15 अस्तिभवतिविद्यतीनां धातुत्वम्। अस्तिभवतिविद्यतीनां धातुसंज्ञा वक्तव्या। यथा हि भवता करोतिना पचादीनां सामानाधिकरण्यं दर्शितम्। न तथास्त्यादीनां निदर्श्यते। न हि भवति किं करोति अस्तीति। *Bhāṣya* on I. 3. 1.

But the notion of 'being' the meaning of the root अस्,, always arises when the accessories are present. Can that notion then be called action? Thirdly, the notion that we have of any particular action seems to admit of degree. We can think of an action being performed at different levels of excellence or otherwise. But the notion of 'being' does not seem to admit of any degree. We can say पचतितराम्, but not अस्तितराम्.

Faced with this difficulty, it is proposed that the root should be defined as something which expresses भाव. The difference between क्रिया and भाव here does not seem to be the same as in Yāska where we saw that the former meant a process and the latter the result of that process. Here Kaiyyaṭa equates भाव with क्रियामात्र, 'action in general'.[16] But this 'action in general' must be distinguished from the meaning of the root कृ which was also said to be action in general whereas roots like पच् were said to express particular action. That is why a verb formed from any root can be used in answer to the question: किं करोति। If भाव also means क्रियामात्र or क्रियासामान्य, what would be the difference between the first view and the second view? An old distinction between क्रिया and भाव found in such works as those of Helārāja and Kaiyyaṭa is that the former is brought about by things having movement whereas the latter is brought about by something which may or may not have any movement, a distinction which, according to Helārāja, Pāṇini has not always observed.[17] The three roots in

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16 भाववचनो धातुः।—*Vār.* on *Pāṇini Sūtra* I. 3. 1. भाववचन इति। भाववचनः क्रियामात्रवाची।—कैय्यट on *Pāṇini* I. 3. 1.

17 (a) क्रियाशब्दः सपरिस्पन्दसाधनसाध्यार्थे रूढ़ो भावशब्द सपरिस्पन्दापरिस्पन्दान्यतरसाध्य इति भावः।— *Udyota* on *Pāṇini* I. 3. 1.

(b) किं च परिस्पन्दस्वभावा लोके क्रिया प्रसिद्धा।—Helārāja on *Vāk.* III. क्रि॰ verse 1.

(c) See also Helārāja on साधनसमुद्देश, verse 66.

question अस्ति, भू and विद् seem just to express the idea of 'Being' or 'Existence' and that does not involve any movement of the accessories. To make this idea of भाव clearer, Kaiyyaṭa refers to the sūtra 'Bhāve' which tells us that suffixes like घञ् are added to roots like पच् in the sense of भाव to form words like पाक There are two elements in the word पाक, the root and the suffix. The former expresses a particular action, the action of cooking and the latter 'action in general' and the two can coexist in the same thing. There is, however, one point to remember. The suffix expresses, no doubt, action in general but it expresses it as a thing and not as a process. This very action in general is expressed by the three roots अस्, भू and विद्, not as a thing, but as a process. Verbs like पचति express particular actions as processes and in these particular processes, action in general, conceived of as a process, also exists. The two can coexist in the same thing. That all roots express भाव or action in general can be seen in such expressions as भवति पचति, भवत्यपाक्षीत्, भवति पक्ष्यति.[18] These expressions sound strange to our ears to day because we are not accustomed to have a Sanskrit sentence consisting exclusively of two finite verbs connected with each other, in meaning,[19] but apparently a combination of the verb भवति (i. e. the 3rd person singular number, present tense form of the root भू) with other verbs in any tense or number was possible. In this combination भवति stands for action in general and पचति for a particular action, But this action in general is nothing more than 'Being' or 'Existence'

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18 (a) कथं पुनर्ज्ञायते भाववचनाः पचादय इति। यदेषां भवतिना सामानाधिकरण्यम्। भवति पचति, भवति पक्ष्यति, भवत्यपाक्षीदिति। भाष्य on *Pāṇinisūtra* 1. 3. 1.

(b) आत्मभरणवचनो भवतिः। तच्चात्मभरणं विरुद्धैकार्थसमवायैः पाचकत्वादिभिरविरुद्धैकार्थसमवायम्। (प्रदीप on Pānini I. 3. 1.

19 क्रिया क्रियया समवायं न गच्छति पचति पठतीति। भाष्य on Pāṇini III. 1. 67.

(सत्ता आत्मभरण) which is found in everything in this world, be it a thing or a process and it can coexist with other specific properties. The expression भवति पचति would ultimately mean : "Being, the agent of which is the same as that of cooking."[20] This Being is the own meaning of the root भू[21] and it is present or rather inherent in the meaning expressed by every other root. The meaning of every other root is only a variation of the meaning of the root भू and that is why भाव has been said to be the meaning of every root. If the root is so defined, अस्, भू and विद् can easily be called roots, because they all just express this 'Being'.

But these three elements will come under the designation 'root' even if the root is defined as something which expresses क्रिया. It was pointed out before that a root is that which expresses a process and that all processes expressed by the different roots are variations of 'action in general' or 'process in general' expressed by the root कृ. If, at this stage, we add that what is called क्रिया is not merely a process, particular or general, but a particular mode of behaviour on the part of the accessories,[22] this addition would have the effect of bringing अस्, भू and विद् under the designation 'root'. To say that क्रिया is a process only amounts to saying that its parts are arranged in a temporal sequence. It is also necessary to remember that no process is like any other. There is a peculiarity in each one of them, a distinctive feature which makes it a क्रिया This distinctive feature is seen in the behaviour of the accessories of the process. As the *Bhāṣya* puts it : One's behaviour towards plain rice is quite different from one's behaviour towards rice with meat in it, though the verb to

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20 यत्कर्तृका पचिक्रिया तत्कर्तृका सत्ता—*Udyota* on 18(b).

21 कः पुनर्भावः। भवतेः स्वपदार्थो भवनं भाव इति।—भाष्य on I. 1. 3.

22 कारकाणां प्रवृत्तिविशेषः क्रिया.—Bhāṣya on Pāṇini I. 3. 1.

eat' (भुज्) can be used in regard to both.[23] Similarly, we see that on those occasions when we use the word अस्ति, the person or persons concerned behave differently from what they do on those occasions when we use the word म्रियते (he dies) showing that the meaning of the root अस् is a process, a क्रिया.[24] In other words, even if we adopt the definition 'क्रियावचनो धातुः', the elements अस्, भू and विद् would be called roots. That is why, concludes the *Bhāṣya*, Vārṣyāyaṇi has included अस्ति among the six transformations of भाव which we may take as meaning क्रिया or सत्ता.

Thus the main ideas which emerge out of the *Bhāṣya* discussion on the subject are: (1) The root can be defined as something which expresses क्रिया. (2) It is necessary to understand क्रिया as कारकाणां प्रवृत्तिविशेष. (3) क्रिया is something different from all the things which play a part, direct or indirect in its accomplishment. It is not प्रत्यक्ष. It can only be inferred. (4) *Bhāṣya* approves of the view of Vārṣyāyaṇi that existence, the meaning of the root अस्, is one of the transformations of भाव or सत्ता and, therefore, action.

Bhartṛhari, as explained by Helārāja, interprets these ideas in his own way and, in doing so, brings out clearly the point of view of the Vaiyyākaraṇas and his own Advaitic predilictions. Helārāja is very anxious here, as on so many other points, to make it quite clear that what is being discussed is not what action really is, but what action, as presented by words, is. What action in reality is may be of interest to philosophers but not to grammarians. He is compelled to remind the reader frequently of this, because some of the statements found here and there in the *Bhāṣya* are likely to cause a misapprehension as to what the grammarians are really trying to do. When, for instance, the *Bhāṣya* declares

23. अन्यथा कारकाणि शुष्कौदने प्रवर्तन्ते अन्यथा च मांसौदने।—भाष्य on *Pāṇini* I. 3. 1.

24. अन्यथा हि कारकाणि अस्तौ प्रवर्तन्ते अन्यथा हि म्रियतौ।—भाष्य on *Pāṇini* I. 3. 1.

on one occasion, in answer to the question "what is the main meaning of the root पच्" ? that it is the process of the grains of rice becoming soft, a doubt naturally arises in one's mind as to whether the *Bhāṣya* is speaking of the nature of the meaning conveyed by the root पच् or is describing something happening outside the realm of words. What the root conveys is not the process of the rice becoming soft, but that of somebody softening it.[25] The two are not the same thing. The former is वस्त्वर्थ and the latter is शब्दार्थ and the grammarian is concerned with the latter and not the former. We must, therefore, try to understand from this point of view that important definition of क्रिया, namely, कारकाणां प्रवृत्तिविशेषः given in the *Bhāṣya* with a view to bring words like अस्, भू and विद् within the scope of what is called a root.

This definition was obviously not very clear even to Grammarians of old because Helārāja records their conflicting ways of understanding it. Is the statement meant to be a definition of action or is it meant to tell us the nature of the meaning conveyed by the root ?[26] Does the word कारकाणां stand for कर्ता only or for कर्ता and कर्म, or for all the other things which can play a part in the accomplishment of an action ? The activities of all the kārakas may be entitled to be called by the name ' action ', but it was felt that the root is not capable of conveying all of them. If, in the sentence, देवदत्तः काष्ठैः स्थाल्यामोदनं पचति, the root primarily

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25 अस्मिन् मते पचेः कः प्रधानोऽर्थः। यासौ तण्डुलानां विक्लित्तिरिति भाष्यं कथम्। कर्तृव्यापारो हि क्रिया धातुवाच्या। सा च विक्लेदना न तु विक्लित्तिः। नास्ति विरोधः। नात्र शब्दार्थो निरूप्यते अपि तु वस्त्वर्थं इत्यार्थेन रूपेण विक्लित्तेः प्राधान्यादेवमुक्तम्। शाब्देन तु रूपेण विक्लित्त्युपसर्जनं विक्लेदनमर्थः। —Helārāja on *Vāk*. III. क्रि०।

26 अतश्च कारकाणां प्रवृत्तिविशेषः क्रियेति क्रियायाः स्वरूपमात्रं कथितं न तु धातुवाच्यत्वम्। यस्य कारकस्य या प्रवृत्तिः सा क्रिया।... काचिदेव धातुनाभिधीयते कर्मगता कर्तृगता वा पच्यते पचतीति।—Helārāja on *Vāk*. III. क्रि०।

expresses the activity of देवदत्त, in some other rather unusual and yet possible sentences like स्थाली पचति, काष्ठानि पचन्ति, ओदनं पचति the same root expresses the activity of some other kāraka, but only after it becomes the कर्ता in the sentence. But even this free and figurative use of words cannot be so extended as to enable us to say: वृक्षः पतति when we mean that the leaf falls off the tree. In other words, the root पत् seems never to be able to express the activity of the kāraka called अपादान. The same thing can be said about संप्रदान. We can never say रामः ददाति to express the idea that something is given to Rāma. The fact that the other kārakas have to become कर्ता in the sentence before the root can express their activity led some to interpret the word 'कारकाणाम्' as referring to कर्ता only, so that what is called action as conveyed by words is nothing more than a peculiar and distinctive mode of behaviour on the part of कर्ता. It is only in passive constructions that it was conceded that the root can convey the activity of the object without the कर्म first becoming the कर्ता in the sentence.

Some hold that by प्रवृत्तिविशेष it is the result of an action and not the action itself which was meant.[27] The root पच् to cook, for instance, means, in the case of a substance like rice, its becoming soft (विक्लित्ति), the root गम् meaning to go, stands for the fact of reaching the destination. A third interpretation was that action meant activity in general and not that of any particular kāraka. It is the common feature found in the activities of all the kārakas, namely, that of bringing about the ultimate result.[28] It is,

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[27] अन्ये तु विशेषपदे भरं कृत्वा प्रवृत्तीनां विशेषः प्रवृत्तिविशेष इति सकलकारकजन्या विक्लित्त्यादिरूपा भूतिः फलभूता कारकप्रवृत्तेः क्रियेति व्याचक्षते ।—Helārāja on *Vāk*. III. क्रि० 1.

[28] तथा हि फलजननैव साधारणात्मिका क्रिया प्रवृत्तिविशेष इत्युच्यते प्रवृत्तिश्चायं विशेषश्चेति । विशेषोऽस्याः फलजननारूपत्वं न पुनरधिश्रयणादिरूपतैव । तेन जननाख्यो विशेषः प्रवृत्तीनां क्रिया ।—Helārāja on *Vak*. III. क्रि० 1.

of course, very unusual to use the word विशेष to denote a common feature, but those who uphold this interpretation apparently did so knowing what they were doing. The common feature found in all actions is that each one has a distinctive feature which distinguishes it from other actions of a similar kind or of a different kind. Thus, the word प्रवृत्तिविशेष stands for a common feature, which ultimately, turns out to be a distinctive feature. That is, when we hear a verb and understand an action from it, it necessarily excludes other actions because it has its own distinctive feature.[29] This is said to be the reason why स्था should be included among the roots. The meaning which it conveys shares the characteristics of क्रिया as defined here. It is a peculiar mode of behaviour which is quite different from other modes of behaviour and, therefore, excludes them. When an enquiry is made about somebody's fever, the answer that it is rising (वर्धते) or that it is falling (अपक्षीयते) is quite different from the answer that it is stationary (स्थितः).[30] In other words, it is a प्रवृत्तिविशेषः and so a क्रिया.

The other idea of action already found in Yāska is that it is a process[31] to which Patañjali adds the further elucidation that it can only be inferred. It is not directly perceptible. Bhartṛhari, as explained by Helārāja, brings out the implication of this idea. Process means something which has parts arranged in a sequence, and therefore, not contemporaneous. How can the idea of a single action arise from parts or moments which cannot co-exist? The answer is that the moments or parts come into existence to serve one single purpose and

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[29] तया हि क्रिया क्रियाया निर्वर्तिका भवति द्रव्यं द्रव्यस्येत्युक्तम् ।—Helārāja on *Vāk.* III. क्रि० 1. and *Bhāṣya* on Pāṇini I. 3. 1.

[30] एवं हि कश्चित् कंचित् पृच्छति किमवस्थो देवदत्तस्य व्याधिः इति। स आह वर्धते इति। अपर आह अपक्षीयत इति। अपर आह स्थित इति। स्थित इत्युक्ते वर्धतेश्चापक्षीयतेश्च निवृत्तिर्भवति ।—*Bhāṣya* on Pāṇini I. 3. 1.

[31] सासावनुमानगम्या ।—*Bhāṣya* on Pāṇini. I. 3. 1.

they are unified in one unifying act of cognition. And that is called action.[32] The parts exist for the whole and are, therefore, identified with the whole. This whole which is a unity and is the result of a unifying act of cognition is the meaning of the root and that is what is called action. The parts are mentally unified because they are all meant to lead to the same result. It is true that some of them are more removed from the ultimate result than others and yet each one is as essential as the others for the production of the ultimate result. That is why they are all unified into a whole mentally and this unity is called action.

Not only do we unify the parts mentally into a whole, but we think of each part as a whole. Cooking is a long process consisting of many little acts. No matter which one of these little acts the cook may be doing at a particular moment, we have no hesitation in saying that he is cooking. In other words, the part is referred to as the whole. That is because all the parts are meant to serve the same purpose and to lead to the same result. With the very first little act which the cook performs, he has already the ultimate result in view. So that the very first act is identified, no doubt wrongly, with the whole action. When that first act is over, we can say that he 'cooked' i. e. use the past tense even though a large number of little acts are yet to come. Similarly, one can use the future tense and say "he will cook" when one thinks of a coming little act which has been identified with the whole.

Each part or moment of an action is directly perceptible and it is that which is wrongly identified with the whole. It is the latter which is action and not each moment. Even though each moment is प्रत्यक्ष, the whole which is identified with it is said to be not so. The *Bhāṣya* has declared quite

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[32] क्रमवतां क्षणानामेकफलोद्देशेन प्रवृत्तानां संकलनाबुद्धया समापादितैक्यानां क्रियात्वव्यवहारः।—Helārāja on *Vāk.* III. क्रि० 4.

definitely that action is inferable only and not directly perceptible. That is because the whole which is superimposed has sequence of parts within it. Only such a whole can be called action and such a whole cannot be directly perceived by the senses. It can only be inferred.[33] Because the part with which the whole is identified is directly perceptible, one has the illusion that the whole is also directly perceptible, but that is not the case.

The cognition of action is further explained by comparing it with that of the word conceived of as a collection of phonemes (वर्णसमुदाय). The word is a series of phonemes and yet it is more than that. It is a unity. Each phoneme is directly perceived by the ear and the word, as a whole, is cognised after the last phoneme is perceived. But this process of cognising the word as a whole is not direct perception. The impressions left by the perceptions of the previous phonemes play an important part in it. It is a kind of unification by the mind. Similarly, a revolving series of torches is wrongly perceived as a unity, as a wheel, and the perception appears to be direct. But it is the mind which, after each torch has been perceived separately, unifies them in one act of cognition and the wheel figures in it. Similarly, the different moments of action are directly perceived and they are unified by one act of cognition. This act of unification by the mind is more than प्रत्यक्ष. That is why the cognition of action is not compared to that of the word looked upon as 'sphoṭa.' The cognition of स्फोट, according to Vaiyyākaraṇas, is a case of pure perception.

What appears as part of an action, as the moment of an action may itself have its own parts, in which case, it has also to be looked upon as action and, therefore, not directly visible. Putting the vessel on the fire may be a part

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33. एकस्मिन्नपि हि क्षणे समूहोऽध्यस्यमानः समाश्रितपौर्वापर्य एवाध्यस्यते। तथारूपस्यैव च क्रियात्वात् तेन च रूपेणेन्द्रियाविषयत्वात्।—Helārāja on *Vāk.* III. क्रि० 6

of the action of cooking, but it has itself parts such as stretching the hands, placing the vessel on the fire and adjusting the supports. Each one of these sub-parts is identified with that part of the action of cooking called putting the vessel on the fire which is itself a unification of these sub-parts and, therefore, action.

There must come a stage when the part cannot be further subdivided. It will be atomic in character. It cannot then be called action at all. Such an atomic point may be directly perceptible, but that would not make an action so, because that would not be action at all. The mere fact that the final indivisible part is प्रत्यक्ष cannot take away the अप्रत्यक्षता of action because that final indivisible part is not action at all. Action is the name of something which has parts arranged in a sequence. The root cannot express something which has no parts. It can only express a process, i.e. something having parts arranged in a sequence. One has to remember here that the real question is not whether action has parts or not. That is really a question for philosophers and not for grammarians. The question is whether the verb presents action as something having parts and the answer is that the root or the verb presents action, however momentary in nature, as something having parts which can not co-exist and, therefore, not directly perceptible.

It has been shown so far that the whole, with the sequence of parts in it, is superimposed on each part and that is action, the meaning expressed by the root or the verb. But this superimposition, this āropa has nothing in common with that other āropa which consists in applying the name of one thing to another because of similarity between two things, as when we call a man a lion because of his strength and courage. There is the real lion and there is the lion by courtesy (उपचार). But there is no such thing as a secondary conception of action as distinct from a primary conception, because there is no conception of action in which the parts

are contemporaneous and have no sequence.[34] Everywhere action means the superimposition of a whole involving sequence of parts. Even a single moment or part with this sequence superimposed on it becomes action.

An idea which is often expressed by Sanskrit grammarians is that क्रिया or भाव, the meaning of a verb is one (एक) or निवृत्तभेद.[35] The question is not whether action or process is, in reality, एक or निवृत्तभेद, but whether, as the meaning of the verb, it is एक or निवृत्तभेद. One of the questions which can be asked about the meaning of any word is whether it is countable or not, whether it admits of the ideas of singularity or plurality to be associated with it. Another question which can be asked is whether the word expresses an idea only in a general way or whether it expresses also all the variety which it is capable of. Jespersen considers the meaning of such English words as leisure, music, success, satisfaction, admiration, restlessness, justice etc. as 'uncountable.' These are all nouns and, ordinarily, the meanings of nouns come under the category of 'countable.' As for the meanings of verbs, he is of the opinion that the idea of one or more than one is not incompatible with them, though he points out that in English and in most languages, the verb does not usually express the singularity or plurality of the action expressed by it.[36]

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[34] गोशब्दस्य सास्नादिमति मुख्यत्वात् तत्समानगुणे वाहीकादावुपचरिता प्रवृत्तिरित्युच्यते । क्रियायास्तु समानकालानाश्रितपौर्वापर्यावसाया अभावान्न? (न्ना) मुख्यता काचित् ।—Helārāja *Vāk*. III. क्रि० 13.

[35] न तिङन्तान्येकशेषारंभं प्रयोजयन्ति। किं कारणम्। यथाजातीयानां द्वितीयस्य पदस्य प्रयोगे सामर्थ्यमस्ति तयाजातीयकानामेकशेषः । न च तिङन्तानां द्वितीयस्य पदस्य प्रयोगे सामर्थ्यमस्ति। किं कारणम्। एका हि क्रिया। एकत्वेनोक्तत्त्वात्तस्यार्थस्य द्वितीयस्य पदस्य प्रयोगेण न भवितव्यम् । उक्तार्थानामप्रयोग इति।—*Bhāṣya*. on *Pāṇini* I. 2. 64.

आख्यातवाच्या क्रिया सर्वैव निवृत्तभेदा प्रतीयते । भवद्भिरास्यत इत्यादौ वस्तुस्थित्या कर्तृभेदाद्भेदेऽपि तिङन्ताद्भेदस्यानवगमात् ।—*Kaiyyaṭa on Bhāṣya* on I. 2. 64.

[36] Jespersen *Philosophy of Grammar*. p. 210.

We have now to see what Sanskrit grammarians meant when they held that क्रिया or भाव, as expressed by a verb, is एका or निवृत्तभेदा. It might be said that to say that action is one is, in itself, associating number with it, because the word 'one' expresses a number. But they did not really mean to say that action was actually associated with the number one.[37] What they meant was that a verb in Sanskrit presents action in a general manner, without touching upon all the infinite variety of which an action is capable. Even such a simple action as cooking is capable of great variety on account of the great variety that there can be in the things cooked, in the modes of cooking and in the persons who cook and in the time of cooking. But without the aid of other words, the verb cannot express all this variety. To repeat an action is to associate it with plurality. A plural verb in Sanskrit does not express the plurality of the action, but that of the agents or that of the objects. While घटाः means many jars, पचन्ति cannot mean many acts of cooking. It only means that those who cook are many in number and does not say anything about all the variety that there might be in the acts of cooking of these many.

What has been said so far applies to action considered as a particular, but it can be looked upon as a universal too. Those who maintain that all words denote universals naturally hold that it is the universal aspect of action which the verb denotes. A universal is something the existence of which is proved by a certain uniformity in our cognition of various things accompanied by the emergence in our

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[37] (a) भेदाभावलक्षणमभेदैकत्वं भावस्य। न त्वेकसंख्याऽऽख्यातवाच्यस्य भावस्यास्ति। तस्या द्रव्यधर्मत्वादसत्वभूतत्वाच्चाख्यातवाच्यस्य भावस्य। *Kaiyyaṭa* on III. p. 67.

(b) एकशब्दश्चायं भेदाभावप्रदर्शनपरो न संख्यावचनः। असत्वभूतत्वेन निःसंख्यत्वात् क्रियायाः।—Helārāja on *Vāk*. III क्रि० verse 40.

mind of the same word in regard to those things.[38] The idea of cooking persists even when the person who cooks and the thing cooked vary. We must, therefore, admit that the universal called action inheres in the different kinds of action. It is this universal which the verb denotes. It also inheres in the different moments of cooking one thing by one person. Each moment in the act of cooking one thing by one person is a व्यक्ति. Similarly, each different act of cooking different things by different people is also व्यक्ति. The universal called action is really eternal, but it appears to be साध्य and to have temporal sequence through its substrata, namely, individual actions or the different moments of action.[39] If an action requires accessories (साधन) for its accomplishment, it is the व्यक्ति aspect of it that requires it. The view that action is a universal is presented in another way also; the universal inhering in that last moment of action after which the fruit results is action. The preceding ones are called action because they exist for the last one.

The process by which the particular moments of action suggest the universal is compared to the process by which the sphoṭa of a word like गौः is suggested by the three phonemes which are uttered for the purpose and which correspond to the moments of action.[40] The moments of action are not contemporaneous and yet they suggest the universal, just as the phonemes of a word cannot exist simultaneously and yet they suggest the sphoṭa of that word. Another comparison is with the different moments of a movement

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38 सर्वत्र प्रत्ययानुवृत्तिप्रमाणसाधिता जातिरिति पचतीति प्रत्ययस्य कर्तृकर्मादिभेदेऽप्यनुवृत्तेः क्रियाव्यक्तिसमवेता जातिरवश्याभ्युपगन्तव्या।—Helārāja on *Vāk.* III. क्रि० verse 20

39 तथा च स्वतो नित्यत्वेऽप्यस्याः स्वाश्रयमुखेन साध्यत्वं च क्रियालक्षणमवतिष्ठते। Helārāja on *Vāk* III. क्रि० v. 20

40 स्फोटवच्चास्या असमसमयभाविभिरपि क्षणैरभिव्यक्तिः।—Helārāja on *Vāk.* III. क्रि० verse 20.

like going round or lifting the arm. Each one of them suggests the universal of that movement.[41]

The universal of action can only be the lower universal (अपरा जातिः). From another point of view, actions is the Supreme Universal (परा सत्ता or महासामान्य), namely 'Being'. Everything in this world is a transformation of this Supreme Universal called 'Being', things as well as actions. Even negative entities are so because they also figure in our mind. Hence every noun-stem denotes this, whether it is the name of a positive or negative entity. 'Being', conditioned by the particular thing where it is found becomes जाति or the lower universal. गोत्व is nothing more than 'Being' as found in the object called गौः and the word गौः denotes this गोत्व. Roots also do the same. They denote 'Being' as existing in the different individual actions which depend upon the accessories for their coming into Being. 'Being' associated with the activity of a thing is called 'action'. Thus it is this सत्ता or Being which is presented as सिद्ध by nouns and as साध्य by roots and there is no third possibility. It is not merely the stem and the root which thus denote Being, but also the suffixes. They denote 'Being' as associated with such 'upādhis' or limiting conditions as number, accessory etc. Not merely according to the Monists, but according to the followers of the Sāṅkhya also, all words denote सत्ता which is the same as what they call महत् or बुद्धि.

What is called 'action' and what is called a 'thing', both these are transformations of सत्ता. A verb expresses this सत्ता as a process, something which has parts arranged in a temporal sequence and which depends upon accessories endowed with movement for its accomplishment. Every verb expresses a particular process of this kind. Even

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[41] यथा वोत्क्षेपणादिक्षणैरसमसमयभाविभिरप्यावृत्त्योत्क्षेपणत्वादिरभिव्यज्यते तथाधिश्रयणादिभिः क्रियाक्षणैः पचत्यादिक्रियाजातिरिति विचारयिष्यते।—Helārāja on *Vāk* III. जा० v.

though these processes have their differences from one another they are all processes. That is their common feature. That is the क्रियाजाति which is a *vivarta* of सत्ता. This is the meaning of all roots. When a process of this type is not understood from a root, when the inner sequence which is the essence of a process is not understood from a root, then what we understand is called सत्त्व which is also a transformation of सत्ता This सत्त्व is also sometimes called द्रव्य . क्रिया is साध्य and सत्त्व is सिद्ध and they are the two transformations of सत्ता which is the same as ब्रह्मन्. To say that all words convey सत्ता is equal to saying that all words convey jāti, because सत्ता is the greatest of all jātis and it is also Brahman.

The view that all actions are only transformations of सत्ता is supported by Yāska also. Yāska quotes with approval the view of Vārṣyāyaṇi who said that there are six transformations of भाव which is the same as सत्ता. The six are: जायते अस्ति, विपरिणमते, वर्धते, अपक्षीयते, विनश्यति। A thing is first born, then it is said to exist, what exists necessarily undergoes change, change means growth and then decay and finally destruction. These socalled transformations of भाव or सत्ता are not real transformations (परिणाम) because that would make सत्ता transitory, they are only *vivartas*. On account of its power called अविद्या, Brahman appears as many. Even though this Power is one, we think of it as many, because its effects are many. These many powers of Brahman are one with Brahman. It is due to them that Brahman appears as all this diversity of words and meanings.

The six transformations mentioned by Vārṣyāyaṇi can be reduced to two: जन्म and विनाश. विनाश seems to be the very opposite of सत्ता and is yet a transformation of it. So is जन्म a transformation of it. The six processes which are said to be transformations of 'Being' can be reduced to these two. Everything is characterised by its own form, its own धर्म, for it to exist means to exist in that form, with that dharma. Before it comes into being, it exists only potentially in its cause, when it abandons this condition of merely

existing potentially in its cause, becomes active, but has not yet fully attained its form, it is said to be born. When it has attained its full form, it is said to exist. Thus existence is only the later stage of the process of being born, otherwise called आविर्भाव. When, without losing its identilty, it begins to change, we say it changes (विपरिणमते). This changing can be either increase or decrease. Decrease ultimately leads to destruction which is also called तिरोभाव. That marks the end of the process of assuming one's own form. Thus there are six processes to which everything in this world is subject to before it totally disappears. But these six processes can be reduced to two, because they are either in the nature of becoming manifest or the opposite of it : आविर्भाव or तिरोभाव. That is why Helārāja says :तदेवं द्वाभ्यां षड् व्याप्ताः ।[42] What it amounts to is that सत्ता manifests itself in the form of six processes which when closely scrutinised, can be reduced to two. The आविर्भाव and तिरोभाव of objects form the basis of all action. Every action is a kind of coming or going, a rising or falling. Even the root स्था denotes a kind of rising or falling.

To sum up : The Supreme Being called Parabrahman, One and devoid of all action, endowed with Infinite Śakti, causes, through अविद्या, the cognition and expression of आविर्भाव and तिरोभाव, or जन्म and नाश. Strictly speaking, there is neither the one nor the other. Brahman is beyond all Diversity (परिकल्प). Because it has all Śaktis within it, it appears in all forms and it appears as having sequence because of its स्वातन्त्र्यशक्ति otherwise called काल. It is this स्वातन्त्र्यशक्ति which causes the cognition of action, consisting of the unification of former and later parts, of Being in the form of a process. Due to dikśakti, things which are no more than ' Being ' in a finished form appear to have spatial divisions. Thus, though it is indivisible it appears to have temporal and spatial divisions. Birth and Death are of the

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42 Helārāja on *Vāk*. III. क्रि० verse 26.

essence of th ese temporal divisions or action as they are called. In other words, all actions are *vivartas* of Brahman. Brahman which is one and indivisible and devoid of all actions apperas to be सक्रिय. Thus 'action' is a '*vivarta*' of Brahman or सत्ता.

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43 एवंभूतास्तस्याः काश्चन शक्तयो विद्यन्ते येनैकैव सती तथा तथा विचित्रेण रूपेण प्रतिभासते । न च परिणतिदर्शनाभिप्रायेणायं विकारशब्दः । अनित्यत्वप्रसंगात् । अपि तु विवर्तपर्यायोऽयम् । तथा हि सर्वशक्त्यात्मभूतत्वाद् ब्रह्मणोऽनेकविकारप्रदर्शनसामर्थ्यलक्षणा अविद्याख्या शक्तिः कार्यभेदादुपचरितनानात्वा समस्तीत्यागमविदः । इत्थं च स्वाभिरेव शक्तिभिरव्यतिरिक्ताभिर्जन्मादिरूपतयाऽविद्यायामाभासते। *Vak*. III. जा. v. ३६

IDENTITY OF KUMBHA IN THE JVARA-TIMIRA-BHĀSKARA*

By R. M. SHASTRI

WHILE discussing the date of Kāyastha Cāmuṇḍa's *Jvara-timira-bhāskara* in one of his notes on Indian chronology, Śrī P. K. Gode has remarked as follows:—

"In the third line of this stanza the epithet "कुंभसूनु" has a reference to the author कायस्थ चंड. In the Bikaner MS, however, we have the reading "कुंभसूनौ" referring to 'भूपे श्रीराजमल्ले'. If this reading is accepted, the reference to राजमल्ल becomes more pointed as we know from epigraphic evidence that राजमल्ल was the son of कुंभ"[1].

The undated Bikaner MS. gives the verse in question as follows:—

देशे श्रीमेदपाठे शरयुगशरभू- पांन्वर्षे (?) दशम्यां
शुक्लायामाश्विनस्य त्रिदशगुरुदिने योगिणीव नूनस्थ: (?)।
भूये श्रीराजमल्ले विलसति वसुधामण्डले कुम्भसूनौ
कायस्थश्चण्डनामा ज्वरतिमिर + + भास्करं संव्यधत्त ॥

Here, apart from the other defective portions which are underlined, the locative form "कुम्भसूनौ" agreeing with 'श्रीराजमल्ले' is peculiar to this single and exceedingly corrupt MS. of the Bikaner Catalogue, all other MSS. reading "कुम्भसूनु:" in the nominative case to agree with the author's name.

It appears strange how Śrī Gode gave any quarter at all to the corrupt Bikaner MS. even against all other MSS he collated for settling the date of Kāyastha Cāmuṇḍa's ज्वरतिमिरभास्कर, which he has otherwise ably discussed,

* Paper read in the Classical Sanskrit Section of the 15th Session of the All-India Oriental Conference, Bombay, 1949.

1. Footnote I, p. 294 of the *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute*, Vol. XII, Part iii.

and how he could persuade himself to the proneness for even problematically accepting the absurd construction suggested by the incompatible locative form कुम्भसूनौ.

Srī Gode seems to have had no direct access to Peterson's *Catalogue of Ulwar MSS.*, as may be inferred from his reference to it without citing the chronogram in its connection and from his making no use of its material on the identity of कुम्भ. Concerning No. 1632 (in his Catalogue proper), Peterson has, on p. 69, observed as follows:—

"*Jvara-timira-bhāskara*. By the Kayastha Chamuṇḍa. The work was composed in Sam. 1546. Bik. p. 643, where our first verse is omitted. It shows that Kumbha was the name of the author's father, not of the father of his patron, king Rājamalla (of Medapata). E. 416."

And p. 156 (No. 416) of the Extracts gives the said first verse (omitted in the Bikaner Catalogue) as follows:—

आ .—स्फुरत्त्रिपुरसुन्दरी – चरणयुग्ममाराधयन्
प्रणम्य च रुजां रिपुं प्रथमवैद्यमंभोधिजम् ।
विलोक्य विविधागमान् करणवीरकुम्भात्मज-
श्चिकित्सितगतिं निजां प्रथयतीह चूडाभिधः ॥१॥

The same MS. gives us comparatively the best or most correct and perfect reading of the last verse of the work as follows :—

च .—देशे श्रीमेदपाटे रसयुगशरभूमत्सुवर्षे १५४६ दशम्यां
शुक्लायामाश्विनस्य त्रिदशगुरुदिने योगिनीपत्तनस्य ॥
भूपे श्रीराजमल्ले विलसति वसुधामंडले कुंभसूनुः
कायस्थश्चंडनामा ज्वरतिमिरहरं भास्करं संव्यधत्त ॥

A comparison of the present reading of this last verse with that found in Śrī Gode's 'oldest dated MS.'[2] would amply show that the latter, though satisfactory for his purpose, is by no means an ideal one. It is faulty enough and suffers from many defects of various types, as would appear

[2] No. 920 of 1884-87 deposited in B. O. R. I. Library.

from the following underlined portions of the stanza in question:—

"देसे श्री. . .मेदपाटे रसयुगसरभूमानवर्षे दसम्यां।
शुक्लायामश्विनस्य त्रिदसगुरुदिने योगिनीपत्रनस्थः॥
भूपेश्रीराजमल्ले निवसति वसुधामंडले कुंभसूनुः।
कायस्थश्च चंडनामा ज्वरतिमिरहरं भास्करं संविधत्ते॥"

Here, the use of the present tense (संविधत्ते) would be quite incompatible with the end of the whole work, where the past tense alone should suit. निवसति, too, is obviously a poor substitute of the poetic (and, in all likelihood, the original) विलसति. The last word of the second quarter could hardly be an adjective of the author's name far-removed from it by the interception of as many as four words describing the patron and leaving no room for any adjective of the author before them, particularly in the absence of any other word in the nominative case coming elsewhere except at the end of the third or in the beginning of the fourth quarter and in view of the relevancy and fitness of the syntactical relation of the reading 'योगिनीपत्तनस्य', as furnished by the Ulwar MS., with 'भूपे श्रीराजमल्ले', etc. Other defects of Śri Gode's 'oldest dated MS.', namely, the use of the dental स in stead of the palatal श in four places, the spelling of आश्विन as अश्विन and पत्तन as पत्रन, and the repetition of च in the fourth quarter so as to result in disturbing its metrical balance, besides the wrong spaces, clumsily separating मेदपाटे from श्री in the first quarter and disjoining the first compact part of the fourth quarter, and lack of due spacing between भूपे and श्रीराजमल्ले at the outset in the third quarter, are too palpable to need any grave scrutiny or weighty discussion.

Yoginīpattana must be a town in Mewād (Medapāṭa) itself. According to Śrī R.R. Halder of the Rajputana Museum, Ajmer, commenting on verse 247 in line 40[3] of

[3] योगिनीपुरमजेयमप्यसौ योगिनीचरणकिंकरो नृपः।
कुन्तलाकलितवैरिसुन्दरी–विभ्रमैरमितविक्रमोग्रहीत्॥२४७॥

the Fourth Slab of the Kumbhalgarh Inscription of the time of Mahārāṇā Kumbhakarna of Mewar, Vikrama Saṁvat 1517, "Yoginīpura is the town of Jāvar in Mewār."[4] That must be योगिनीपत्तन in question. Annexed by his father, Mahārāṇā Kumbha, the town seems to have continued to form part of the kingdom of Rājamalla as well down to the date of the composition of the ज्वरतिमिर-भास्कर.

Although the number of the underlined, *i.e.*, defective, portions of the reading of Śrī Gode's 'oldest dated MS.' exceeds those of the Bikaner MS., the former is more correct and reliable than the latter in regard to the date of the work and the reference to कुम्भ than the latter. Thus, the Bikaner MS., which has confused the two last-named main points, has proved quite worthless for even the slightest reliance to be put on its version of them.

The discovery, on the list of the Mewāḍ rulers, of one राजमल्ल reigning at the time of the previous date (1489 A.C.)[5] established by the various MSS. of the ज्वरतिमिरभास्कर, and the absence of that name from the same list for other times and particularly in connection with the subsequent date (1623 A.C.)[6] should have sufficed for Śrī Gode to draw his conclusions. But for that purpose the inclination of a reputed scholar of his standing for even a conditional acceptance of the wrong reading "कुम्भसूनौ" of the Bikaner MS. which has confused matters rather than shed any genuine light on them is least intelligible and should have been cautiously checked within, because it is a futile supposition like the idea of building a castle on the flimsy foundation of sands and is the virtual perpetuation of an erroneous view pointed out as such by Peterson long long ago. Similarly, the corrupt reading of the same MS. regarding the chronogram, which yields the date 1545 V. S. (शरयुगशरभू००) against

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[4] Epigraphia Indica, Vol. XXI, Part vi (April 1932), p. 28.

[5] Aufrecht: *Catalogus Catalogorum*, Part II, p. 44.

[6] *Ibid.*, Part I, p 214.

1546 (रसयुगशरभू००) as supplied by all other MSS., ought to have been simply discarded rather than partly relied on or accredited as done by the learned writer of the said note.[7]

Irrespective of what the rejectible reading of the Bikaner MS. might suggest, the fact furnished by all other MSS., namely, that कुम्भ, refered to in the end of the ज्वरतिमिरभास्कर, is the name of the author's father and not that of the father of his patron, king राजमल्ल (ruling over योगिनीपत्तन or Jāvar in मेदपाट), remains undisputed and is also wholly borne out by the words "करणवीर-कुम्भात्मजः" and "चूडाभिधः" in the third and fourth quarters of Peterson's first verse[8] quoted above (which is omitted in the Bikaner MS.). These words agree almost in full, with "कुम्भसूनुः" and "कायस्थश्चण्डनामा" of the last verse. चूड might be the copyist's mistake for, or a variant (*i.e*, another name like चामुण्ड) of चण्ड. करण, in the present context, means an 'office' or 'instrument' (pen, etc.); and करणवीर (a word formed after the instances of रणवीर, धर्मवीर, दानवीर, युद्धवीर, दयावीर, etc.) would accordingly, be equal to either, 'कलमशूर', a proverbial epithet of Kāyasthas, or 'the hero of an office', *i.e.*, an 'official', which is the same as 'Kāyastha'. Hence 'करणवीर-कुम्भात्मजः is in other words the same as 'कुम्भसूनुः कायस्थः', both the expressions having been used by the author for himself and meaning that he was a Kāyastha and the 'son of Kumbha'. In the former expression 'करणवीर' may be taken as an epithet of either the author's father कुम्भ, or कुम्भ's son, *i.e.*, the author himself, according to the precedence being given in the dissolution to a कर्मधारय compound between करणवीर and कुम्भ or to a षष्ठीतत्पुरुष between कुम्भ and आत्मजः; whereas, in the latter expression, 'कायस्थ' is unmistakably the epithet of the author, who in both places is undoubtedly the son of Kumbha.

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7 *ABORI*, XII, iii, p. 295.

8 *Vide* Extract No. 416, p. 156, of the Ulwar Catalogue.

Thus, the Ulwar MS. with its two verses, first and last, of equal import on the point in question precludes all possibility of 'Kumbha' to be construed as the father of king Rājamalla. Although Rājamalla, too, was 'a son of one Kumbha', *i.e.*, was the second son of the famous Mahārāṇā Kumbha-Karṇa of Mewāḍ; yet this fact is quite foreign to the *Jvaratimira-bhāskara*.

Again, we know from Aufrecht and other sources that the self-same author, चण्ड or चामुण्ड, wrote another work on medicine named *Rasa-saṅketa-kalikā*.[9] The book is already published[10]. The printed book begins with the following verse:—

शिवं नत्वा रसेशं चा–मुण्डः कायस्थवंशभूः।
करोति रससङ्केत-कलिकामिष्टसिद्धिदाम् ॥१॥

Here, the name of the author is clumsily dragged between the first and the second quarters of the stanza, which fact amounts to a defect in composition.[11]

Dr. Rajendralāl Mitra's MS., however, gives a faultless reading of the first hemistich as follows:—

शिवं नत्वा रसाधीशं चण्डः कायस्थकुम्भभूः।

The said MS. is reported to have been deposited in the house of a Brāhmaṇa of Varāhanagara, Dist. 24 Parganas, Bengal. Its reading of the first line appears to have been the original one inasmuch as it is free from all blemishes and gives the names of both the author as well as his father in exactly the same way in which they appear in the ज्वरतिमिर-भास्कर. The equations करणवीर-कुम्भात्मजः —कुम्भसूनुः कायस्थः— कायस्थ-कुम्भभूः have one and the same value in both the works

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[9] No. 943 of A. V. Kathavate's MSS., 1891-95, p. 62; No. 910 of Rājendralāl Mitra's MSS, Vol. II, pp. 304-5; and Oudh MSS. of Nesfield and Pandit Deviprasāda, 1877, No. 62.

[10] Āyurvedīya Granthamālā, No. 7, by Vaidya Jādavji Tricumji Achārya, 372, Borā Bazār Street, Fort, Bombay (1912, priced 3 annas).

[11] *Kāvyādarśa*, III. 152-153; Kāvyaprakāśa, Chapter VII, Kārikā 53.

of the author. The original reading which is represented by the said वराहनगर MS. seems to have been tampered with in the printed text or in either of the two MSS. collated for the edition in preparing the press copy. It appears that the editor or either of the copyists of the two MSS., as the case might have been, took the liberty of changing 'चण्ड' and 'कुम्भ' of the original into 'चामुण्ड' and 'वंश' respectively, and then had to contract रसाधीशं into रसेशं under the exigency of (keeping the balance of) the अनुष्टुभ् metre. It was to be so because, in all probability, he thought that 'चामुण्ड', as it reads in the colophons, should be the only correct form of the author's name and also perhaps because he could not make out what the expression कुम्भभूः or the word कुम्भ signified. This unfairly pedantic attempt, to which many an uncritical modern Paṇḍita is habituated, ultimately resulted in the awkward or defective cleavage of one and the same word चामुण्डः, the author's name, into two parts, 'चा'—marking the end of the first quarter and 'मुण्डः' c›ming in the beginning of the second one.

Thus, from the first line of the रससङ्केतकलिका read in the light of the वराहनगर MS. and from the following colophon of the book, "इति [श्री-] नैगम-[ज्ञातीय-] कायस्थचामुण्डकृतायां रस-सङ्केतकलिकायां प्रथमोल्लासः", we gather that the author's name was चण्ड or चामुण्ड, that the name of his father was कुम्भ, that he was a कायस्थ of the renowned नैगम clan, mentioned in numerous inscriptions from Mālava,[12] Rājasthāna[13] and Gujarāta,[14] which is now-a-days erroneously called the निगम section among the Citragupta-Kāyasthas or Brahma-Kāyasthas of the U.P. and M. P., and, lastly, that his religious persuation was Śaivism with Śākta leanings, as is proved by his salutation to Śiva and meditation on Tripura-sundarī's

12 Fleet: *Inscriptionum Indicarum*, Vol. III. (Gupta Incriptions) No. 35.

13 *Ep. Ind.*, *IX.* 64 ff.; *Ep. Ind.*, *IX.* 68 off. and *Ind. Ant.*, *XL.* 146 ff.

14 *Bombay Gazetteer*, Vol. I, Part *I—History of Gujarat*, Bhinmal Inscriptions, p. 477 (No. *X*), l. 7; p. 478 (No. *XII*), l. 9.

bright pair of feet, respectively at the commencement of the *Rasa-saṅketa-kalikā* and *Jvara-timira-bhāskara*, his two important works on the Medical Science. It is now quite clear that in his works our author mentions the name of कुम्भ standing, beyond all shadow of doubt, for none else but his own father.

These facts finally settle the point that Kumbha in the last stanza of the ज्वरतिमिरभास्कर is the father of the Kāyastha चण्ड or चामुण्ड, the author, and not Mewāḍ's Mahārāṇā Kumbhakarṇa, the father of राजमल्ल, our author's patron, as was misrepresented by the condemned reading of the Bikaner MS., or as, on its basis, has been problematically accepted by Śrī P. K. Gode.

A HISTORICAL PROBLEM CONNECTED WITH THE MĀLAVIKĀGNIMITRAṀ

By KAILASH CHANDRA OJHA

THE play named *Mālavikāgnimitraṁ* of Kālidāsa is mainly devoted to the dramatization of a love story of Agnimitra and Mālavikā. It cannot be said whether this story contains even a single grain of sober history or not. This much is, nowever, certain that this Agnimitra is identical with the Agnimitra of the Śuṅga dynasty.

The drama represents King Agnimitra as a sovereign ruler of Vidiśā referring to him as 'rājā'. The opening verse speaks of the king as all powerful (एकैश्वर्ये स्थितः). In verse 12, Act II, the king is said to shine with as great a radiance as the sun himself (सर्वैरुस्नैः समग्रैः त्वमिव नृपगुणैः दीप्यते सप्तसप्तिः). At one place, in Act V, the king is called 'deva' (अहो कल्याणी देवस्य बुद्धिः). Such high titles for Agnimitra have been used frequently throughout the drama, and all this gives a good impression that he was an independent sovereign ruler. Even in external affairs, such as, the declaration of war or peace with the foreign kingdom of Vidarbha, he is the sole authority and he has to consult no one else. Once indeed a reference to Puṣyamitra has occurred in Act V, but here he is mentioned only with ordinary titles of 'deva' and 'Senāpati' (अयं देवस्य सेनापतेः पुष्यमित्रस्य सकाशात् सप्राभृतको लेखः प्राप्तः), and there is little to indicate that Agnimitra was his subordinate. Besides thus giving the impression that Agnimitra was a sovereign ruler, the *Mālavikāgnimitraṁ* also suggests that he was a small ruler. He passes most of his time in quarrelling with petty states like Vidarbha, and there is little to indicate that his kingdom stretched much beyond the territories being near about Vidiśā. This extent of his

territories is corroborated even by historical evidences which know of Agnimitra only as a small ruler.

In this background there comes a passage[1] in the drama which says that Vasumitra, the son of Agnimitra, guarded the sacrificial horse roaming on the bank of the Indus let loose by Puṣyamitra, the father of Agnimitra :—

स्वस्ति। यज्ञशरणात् सेनापतिः पुष्यमित्रो वैदिशस्थं पुत्रमायुष्मन्तं अग्निमित्रं स्नेहात्परिष्वज्य अनुदर्शयति। विदितमस्तु। योऽसो राजयज्ञदीक्षितेन मया राजपुत्रपरिवृतं वसुमित्रं गोप्तारमादिश्य संवत्सरोपावर्तनीयो निरर्गलस्तुरगो विसृष्टः। स सिन्धोर्दक्षिणे रोधसि चरन्नश्वानीकेन यवनानां निषिद्धः। ततः उभयोः सेनयोर्महानासीत् संमर्दः।

ततः परान्पराजित्य वसुमित्रेण धन्विना।
प्रसह्य ह्रियमाणो मे वाजिराजो निर्वर्तितः॥१५॥

सोऽहमिदानीमंशुमतेव सगरः पौत्रेण प्रत्याहृताश्वो यक्ष्ये। तदिदानीं अकालहीनं विगतरोषचेतसा भवता वधूजनेन सह यज्ञसन्दर्शनायागन्तव्यमिति।

Wilson interpreted the word 'Sindhu' of this passage in its common sense of the river Indus.

Cunnigham,[2] however, opposed this view. He identified 'Sindhu' with the Sindhu of Central India on the ground that the *Mālavikāgnimitraṁ* indicates a very limited extension of territories which could in no case stretch up to the river Indus :

"But as Puṣyamitra and his son Agnimitra are called the rulers of Vidiśā, which is described as lying to the north of the Vindhya mountains, and bounded by the kingdom of Vidarbha or Berar on the south, Sindhu of the drama cannot possibly be the Indus. The great Indus also flows from north to south, and has no south bank on which the skirmish with the Yavana cavalry, as described by Puṣyamitra, could have taken place .... The only one which has a south bank is the famous Sindhu of Narwar."

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[1] *Mālavikāgnimitraṁ* Act V.
[2] Wilson, *Theatre of the Hindus*, II, p. 253.

This view of Cunningham has been accepted even by Vincent Smith[3] ,Rapson[4] , N. N. Ghosh[5] and others.

But Cunningham's theory has been challenged by Dr. R. C. Majumdar[1] who is in favour of identifying 'Sindhu' with the river Indus. His point that the performance of a horse sacrifice is indicative of Puṣyamitra's possession of the Northern India including the river Indus, may not be very convincing because we know of even small rulers who performed this sacrifice. Similarly, the reason for referring to the news of Vasumitra's victory over the Yavanas on the bank of the Sindhu through Puṣyamitra living at Magadha may be due only to dramatic exigency of breaking the news suddenly, and not due to Sindhu necessarily being a distant river. Nevertheless there is considerable force in other points of Dr. Majumdar's argument. He has rightly observed that there is no need of rejecting the identification of the Sindhu with the Indus on the ground that the latter has not got any of its banks in southern direction. As Dr. Majumdar has said the Indus might have had a southern bank in earlier times, and then 'dakṣiṇa' in Sanskrit does not necessarily mean only 'southern'. It is used commonly even in the sense of 'right'. The learned Doctor has further cited the testimony of the *Divyāvadāna* to show that Puṣyamitra ruled up to Sākala, and it is not unlikely that his sacrificial horse roamed on the right bank of the Indus. Dr. H. C. Raychuadhuri[2] also has accepted the extension of Puṣyamitra's dominions up to Sākala. With Dr. Majumdar, Dr. K. P. Jayaswal[3] and Śrī R. P. Chanda[4] also have shown that

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3 Cunningham. *Num. Chronicle*, 1870, pp. 226-227.

4 Smith, *EH* , p. 209.

5 Rapson, *Camb. Hist. Ind.*, Vol. I, p. 520.

6 N. N. Ghosh, *EH*, p. 159.

7 R. C. Majumdar, *Some observations on Pushymitra and His Empire II* , *IHQ*, Vol. I, pp. 214-219.

8 H. C. Raychaudhuri, *PHAI*. p. 371.

9 K. P. Jayaswal, *JBORS*, Vol. IV, pp. 257-265.

10 R. P. Chanda, *IHQ*, Vol. V, pp. 393ff. and pp. 587ff.

Puṣyamitra was a great ruler ruling over the country extending up to the Indus and thar he rivalled even the great Aśoka. On the evidence of a vague passage of the *Ārya-Mañjuśrī Mūlakalpa* Dr. P. C. Bagchi[11] has said that Puṣyamitra's kingdom extended even much beyond Indus. At any rate, it is now generally accepted that Puṣyamitra included the river Indus in his kingdom at sometime, and in all likelihood the 'Sindhu' of the *Mālavikāgnimitraṁ* is the river Indus.

Then the problem arises how can we reconcile the narrow geographical atmosphere of Agnimitra's kingdom given in the *Mālavikāgnimitraṁ* with the roaming of Puṣymitra's sacrificial horse at the same time as far as the Indus as stated in the same work? But this problem is not so difficult to solve.

To us it seems that the *Mālavikāgnimitraṁ* represents the Suṅga kingdom at the time of Agnimitra. It shows that during this period this kingdom was not very large. This representation of the *Mālavikāgnimitraṁ* is attested to even by the historical evidences which indicate that Agnimitra ruled most probably over a small kingdom. Thus, while depicting Agnimitra's reign the drama has drawn upon even other historical facts to weave out its plot. In doing so, like other plays of Sanskrit, it has no doubt, left aside all consideration of synchronism. To give just one instance, the *Mudrārākṣasa* has described Candragupta's invasion of Magadha with that of the Yavanas, the Sakas and the Hūṇas without caring that these took place at the intervals of several centuries. Similarly, the *Mālavikāgnimitraṁ* also, without consideration of time, seems to have put Puṣyamitra's horse sacrifice going up to the Indus under Agnimitra's rule. The playwright was in need of pleasing Dhārinī in the interest of the development of his plot and as the events of Vidiśā were not in her favour, he made a good news come from outside. Agnimitra's father Puṣyamitra,

[11] P. C. Bagchi, *IHQ*, Vol. XII, 1946, pp. 81 ff.

known so well to have ruled at Pāṭaliputra and to have performed a horse sacrifice as given in the *Mahābhāṣya* and to have fought with the Yavanas as given in the *Mahābhārata*, appeared to him a source of this news. He added Vasumitra as the guard of his sacrificial horse, and made him Dhāriṇī's son to make the news of Puṣyamitra's success pleasing to her. As a matter of fact we need not take all these events to have actually occurred at the same time on the basis of the *Mālavikāgnimitraṁ*. Their knitting together in one spring is more or less the dramatist's creation, and we should not take it very rigidly. Thus, even in the view of the plot of the *Mālavikāgnimitraṁ* giving Puṣyamitra's horse-sacrifice on the Indus and Agnimitra's limited sovereignty of Vidiśā simultaneously, it is possible to take these events in succession as suggested by the historical evidences.

Taken in this light the plot of the *Mālavikāgnimitraṁ* will rid us of one other paradox as well. Some scholars[12] have suggested that as Agnimitra has the sovereign titles in the drama, Puṣyamitra should be his subordinate in Magadha. But this suggestion arising naturally out of the circumstances given in the *Mālavikāgnimitraṁ* goes contrary to the historical evidences which show that Puṣyamitra himself became a king[13]. The above discussion, however, suggests that Agnimitra with his sovereign titles lived in a time different from that of Puṣyamitra. It is nothing unusual that during his sovereignty Puṣyamitra continued to bear only his early modest titles especially because such imperial titles as 'परमभट्टारक', 'महाराजाधिराज', etc. were not in vogue up to his time. Aśoka and his successors know nothing of them and even long after Puṣyamitra, all great rulers of India took only the modest titles of 'svāmī', 'rājā' etc.

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[12] Wilson. *Theatre of the Hindus*, p. 348 ; Sankar Pandurag Pandit, *Mālavikāgnimitraṁ*, *Notes*, p. 220 ; Dasharatha Sharma, *IHQ*, Vol. XXV, 1949, pp. 214 ff. and others.

[13] R. C. Majumdar, *IHQ*, Vol. I, pp. 92-94.

In conclusion, it may be said that due to the addition to our knowledge of the history of Puṣyamitra it is no more plausible to stick to Cunningham's identification of the 'Sindhu' of the *Mālavikāgnimitraṁ* with the Sindhu of Central India, and thus, to limit Puṣyamitra's dominions only up to that part in the west. Most probably, as known generally, this river is the Indus. The *Mālavikāgnimitraṁ* is no hindrance in this assumption, if we interpret it in its true perspective.

DATE OF THE BHĀRAT WAR[1]—A REJOINDER

By PRABODH CHANDRA SENGUPTA

IN the *Journal of the Ganganatha Jha Research Institute* for November, 1950, has been published a paper on the *Date of the Bhārata War* by Prof. Tarakeswar Bhattacharyya wherein my views have been referred to and this has led me to make the following remarks in this paper.

In the settlement of the date of a prehistoric real event such as this Bhārata war was, the first and foremost thing to do is the selection of the data. If the data for finding the Bhārata War could be selected from some archeological source belonging to the date of the War or near about it, they would have been very good indeed. But no such finds have yet been brought to light, even if such are found

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[1] *Errata*—Readers would kindly make the following corrections in the Paper—*Date of the Mahābhārta War*, Published in our Journal Vol. VIII. Pt. 1.—Author.

Page	Line	For	Read
4	11	त्रिभागशेपपक्षोयं	त्रिभागशेषः पक्षोयं
18	28	$\therefore 1900 - D = \frac{46 \cdot 2}{19 \cdot 4}$	$\therefore 1900 - D = \frac{46 \cdot 2}{19 \cdot 4} \times 1401 = 3335$
37	12	सप्तपि पुत्राः	सप्तर्षि पत्न्यः ।
,,	20	चाप्यभीप्त्यामः	चाप्यभीप्सामः ।
39	6	Put full stop after inadmissible.	
,,	7	Delete *that*	
52	20	ह्यदितौ	ह्युदितौ
61	12	Suppolied	Supplied
,,	27	Kṛṣṇa 23rd	Kṛṣṇa 3rd
,,	31	Kṛṣṇa 78	Kṛṣṇa 8th
,,	34	2nd to 16th Śukla	3rd to 16th Śuklā.
63	3	12	12°
68	24	Lang	Lung
73	1	Years	days
76	13	25 29	15 29

in future they would be useless. For instance, in the Mohenzo Daro and Harappa finds it is seen that some form of writing was known at the times of this Indus Valley civilization now extinct, but these writings have not yet been properly deciphered. But the seal cylinders and pottery discovered at Mohenzo Daro and Harappa and their comparative study with the relics found in Mesopotamia have led the archeologists to conclude that this Indus valley civilization flourished from 2500 to 2300 B. C. We cannot hope to discover such finds of the Pāṇḍavas in other countries as the Kurus and Pāṇḍavas were not a maritime people like the men of the Indus Valley civilization of old. We have to depend on the *Mahābhārata* alone in the present case, specially for astronomical data. A most critical examination of the data selected for the purpose is absolutely necessary. We cannot go upon pure *faith* or we shall commit the greatest error.

Prof. Bhattacharyya in his paper says that in the Pāṇḍava times in calendar making the astronomy used was "of fairly an advanced type."[2] This is one of his wrong notions. The Indian scientific siddhāntas came into being from 421 of the Śaka year or 499 A.D. the time of Āryabhaṭṭa. We may also concede that an unscientific *Sūrya-siddhānta* may have been in existence about 400 A.D. but not earlier. The writer's date of the Bhārata War is 1432 B.C. This was also the *Vedāṅga Jyautiṣa* age, when in calendar making with the 5 year luni solar cycles, the second Āṣāḍha and the second Pauṣa were the only additive months. The months were always lunar. The solar months were not in existence, not to speak of their being known in those times. There was no necessity on the part of Prof. Bhattacharyya for calculating the solar months or using them in his interpretation. In the whole of the *Mahābhārata*,

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[2] Page 1.

:here is no mention or enumeration of the signs of the zodiac. It must, however, be admitted that the astronomical events leading to the date of the Bhārata war were astronomically observed ones. Even the winter solstice day was an *observed* event carefully determined.

In order to find out the year of the Bhārata War I made a selection of no less than eight *Mahābhārata* statements which I understood, were all *astronomically consistent and reliable* excepting the last one—a dubious uttrance as admitted by more than one researchers.

Prof. Bhattacharyya in his paper makes capital of this last statement and its line is—

त्रिभागशेषः पक्षोऽयं शुक्लो भवितुमर्हति, or that the half lunar month should be (or should have been) the light half. If Bhīṣma's last line of utterance had been त्रिभागशेषः पक्षोऽयं शुक्ल एव न संशयः none could ever take it to mean otherwise. There is evidently reason to doubt the *faith* expressed in the utterance. As researchers we are to look for truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. As to Kṛṣṇa's words to Karṇa, "From the seventh day from to day, there will be the period of the moon's invisibility; begin the battle in that as its presiding deity has been declared to be Indra i.e. the new moon day was on the Jyeṣṭhā day which was the eighth," Kṛṣṇa must have made this utterance to Karṇa on the *Maghā* (*Regulus*) day. Prof. Bhattacharyya would make us believe that the great fight began on this new-moon day itself. Kṛṣṇa's utterance is an important one no doubt, as it gives us a data which indicates the year in our time which is similar to the year of the Bhārata War, but it cannot give us the real date on which the great fight began. There are very potent reasons in support of my contention.

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[3] Page 2

Prof. Bhattacharyya has tried his best to *destroy* the six of my other references culled from the *Mahābhārata*. We take them up for reconsideration. My next reference is taken from *Bhīṣma parva*, Chapter 2. I have consulted the edition of the *Mahābhārata* as edited by the *Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute*. The true reading according to my judgment is—

आलक्ष्ये प्रभया हीनां पौर्णमासीं च कार्तिकीम् ।
चन्द्रोऽभूदग्निवर्णश्च समवर्णे नभस्तले ।।

I assert that I made no mistake in writing आलक्षे for आलक्ष्ये and also wrote पद्मवर्णे in place of समवर्णे. True it is here that "of the same colour" and "of the colour of lotus" here mean the same thing. My translation was—

"To-night I find the full-moon at the *Kṛttikās* (*Pleiades*) lustreless, the moon became of a fire colour in a lotus hued heaven".

This must be considered as substantially correct. As the stanza occurs as an utterance from Vyāsa in the second chapter of the *Bhīṣmaparva* on the eve of the Bhārata War i.e. evening just before the great fight began, it can never mean the full-moon of lunar Kārtika which came about a month before this date. By this interpretation, Vyāsa would be an असम्बद्ध-प्रलापी or wild talker and to take the event as such would also be अप्रासंगिक. Prof. Bhattacharyya has committed the sin which is styled वितथाभिनिवेश: or wrong thinking. His statement that there is not other reading of the stanza than what he has made out on page 68, third para, is falsified by the correct reading found by me from the *Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute* edition.

Prof. Bhattacharyya does not seem to recognise that in those days there were two paurṇamāsīs and two āmāvāsyās, viz. the *pūrvā* and the *aparā* as in the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa*, Ch. 32.10, cited in the footnote on page 5 of my work '*Ancient*

Indian Chronology' and mentioned before me by Dikxit and others. Of the two paurṇamāsīs, the first was styled *Anumati* and the second was *Rākā*. Similarly, the two *amāvāsyās* were called *sinī-vālī* and *kuhū*. These terms are still found in the ordinary modern Sanskrit dictionaries.

In my battle calendar on pp. 16—19 of my work, on page 17, on Nov. 3, 2449 B.C. at K. M. T. 5 hours 8 min. P.M. are shown—

Appt. Moon $=363^\circ\ 34'$
,, Sun $=202^\circ\ 4'$
Difference$=161^\circ\ 30'$.

If we take the mean diameter of the moon to be of 12 digits, the maximum breadth of the illuminated portion of the moon's disc would be given by—

$6(1-\cos 161^\circ\ 30'.)$ digits nearly
$=11.69$ digits nearly.

Now this moon at 5° ahead of *kṛttikās* should be considered as kārtikī full-moon and almost full with such a maximum breadth of illuminated portion. Hence, according to Vyāsa's estimate it was the *anumati paurṇamāsī*, the full-moon – exact opposition happened about 37 hours later. On the evening in question the *tithi* of the moon was the 14th current which would last for about 13 hours more. Hence, according to me the verses for the 1st day of the fight would be—

हेमन्ते प्रथमे मासि शुक्लपक्षे चतुर्दशीम् ।
प्रवृत्तं भारतं युद्धं नक्षत्रे ब्रह्मदैवते ॥

That I am a staunch follower of the *Bhārata sāvitrī* is totally falsified by the above considerations. I have been a follower of the *Mahābhārata* and of nothing else.

In my next four references derived from the *Mahābhārata Droṇa Parva*, Chs. 185—87, I could not as Prof. Bhattacharyya has done, ignore or repudiate the fact that on the night following the 14th day of the fight, a crescent moon rose quite consistently with my reference (2) about

the Kārtikī paurṇamāsī some time before the next sunrise i.e. about two hours before. On the following morning at sun rise the kṣatriyas stood up and said their morning *sandhyā* prayer, as in chapter 187, on the battle field itself.

My next reference was Baladeva's statement which is well-known and runs as—

चत्वारिंशदहान्यद्य द्वे च मे निःसृतस्य वै ।
पुष्येण संप्रयातोऽस्मि श्रवणे पुनरागतः ॥[4]

which may be translated as, "Since I started, to-day is 40 days and two more; I went away with the moon at *Puṣya* and have returned with the moon at *Śravaṇā* (*Altair*)."

Clearly then the last day of the fight was a *Śravaṇā* day. It shows that the interval between the Jyeṣṭhā and Śravaṇā days being either 4 or 31 days and that the war lasted for 18 days, the inevitable conclusion is that on the first day of the war the moon was about 13·5 days old and she was conjoined with *Rohiṇī* (Aldebaran) in the preceding night. The light half continued about 1.25 days more.

In the above sixth reference of mine Prof. Bhattacharyya does the climax of his performance, when he would transpose or interchange the words पुष्येण and श्रवणे and read the 2nd line as श्रवणे संप्रयातोऽस्मि पुष्येण पुनरागतः to suit his purpose. This is considered inadmissible by all Sanskritists. According to one of them the natural meaning of this stanza, which is very clear, should never be *destroyed* by this sort of transposition. Prof. Bhattacharyya's contention that Baladeva returned on the *Pusya* day is thus totally wrong. He is here destroying a *Mahābhārata statement as it explodes root and branch of the thesis of his paper.*

The *Mahābhārata* statements discussed above show that the time elasped between the *Jyeṣṭhā* new-moon and the last day of the fight. The Śravaṇā day, must be 31 days. Now

[4] Salya Parva, Cha. 34, 6.

the 7th of my selection of data says, that Yudhiṣṭhira had lived at Hastināpura for *fifty* nights (after the war was over) and remembered that the day of expiration of the chief of the Kauravas had come. He went out of Hastināpura with a party of priests after having *seen* that the sun had stopped from the southerly course and that the northerly course had begun.

Here the additional fifty-nights after the thirty one nights shown above make the interval between the *Jyeṣṭhā* new-moon to the day of expiry of Bhīṣma, a period of 81 days which comprise two and three fourths lunations thus:—

Two lunations	=59	nights	or days	
$\frac{3}{4}$ lunations	=22	,,	,,	,,
Total	=81	,,	,,	,,

Now, with the *Jyeṣṭhā* new-moon was begun the new-moon ending month of *Mārga* and in the $2\frac{3}{4}$ lunations we arrive at the day of the last quarter of lunar Māgha new-moon ending. This was the day of Bhīṣma's expiry, the *aṣṭakā* day of the new-moon ending Māgha.

It may yet be urged that the *Mahābhārata* statements refer not to the new-moon ending lunar months but to the full moon ending months. Here, I have to say that in those days the character of the lunar months changed from new-moon ending to full-moon ending and *vice versa* at very short intervals. In my paper, '*Researches in Ancient Indian chronology*'[6], it has been shown that in *four years* the nature of the lunar months could be readily changed from new-moon ending to full-moon ending and *vice versa*, when observational methods were employed in finding the winter solstice days. In 4 years there are 1461 days or 49.5 lunations=1461.74 days. The reader is here referred to the *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa* K. I, p. 8, Anu. 10, 2.

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[5] Anuśāsana, Parva Ch. 167, 5—6.

[6] Published in the *JRAS Bengal* Letters Vol. XVI No. 1, 1950.

I trust it would now be conceded that Prof. Bhattacharyya has been very unfair in attempting to *destroy* so many as five *Mahābhārata* statements of my selection which all go against his selection and interpretation of data.

We now proceed to examine his data, calculations and findings. These are:—

(a) Bhīṣma died on the southern (winter) solstice day itself, at the beginning of the solar month of Māgha.

(b) The *tithi* on the day of his expiry was śukla eighth.

(c) That the war began just 67 days before his death.

(d) The *tithi* of the first day of the battle or fight was Amāvāsyā.

Prof. Bhattācharyya has brought out the day of Bhīṣma's expiry as January 2, 1431 B. C. on which the sun reached the winter solstice about 8 minutes past mean noon of Kurukṣetra. We must say that Yudhisthira could not have an astronomer who could tell him that the sun would reach the winter solstice at the noon of that day. The observers could only settle by observation which was the winter solstice day. It cannot be again said that Yudhiṣṭhira was certain at Hastināpura that the sun had already started in the northerly course before he started for the battle-field on the morning of the day of Bhīṣma's expiry. He had appointed observers who most probably told or assured him that the *Ekaviṁśa* day had been the preceding day. On this point the reader should consult Chapter XIII of my work, "*Ancient Indian Chronology*." Bhīṣma's expiry must have been not on the winter solstice day itself but on the day following.

His first datum is wrong and consequently the finding also. Prof. Bhattacharyya should not have missed the point that at the maximum or minimum, the change in the function is almost imperceptible. If the winter solstice day is determined by observation of the sun's amplitude

at rising or setting at or by the length of the noon shadow, it cannot be done accurately by one observation.

His other three data are all totally inadmissible as shown before. Thus his thesis stands on nothing real.

Prof. Bhattacharyya finds the date for the consecration of Yudhiṣṭhira for the Aśvamedha sacrifice in the year 1431 B.C. i. e., in his very year of the Bhārata war. Here the sun's longitude should have been about 330° and not 335° 44′27″. The date should have been according to the *Vedāṅga* calendar, 2 years 2 lunations and 2 *tithis* after Bhīṣma's expiry. On this point the reader should consider the events described in chapters 62-70 of the *Aśvamedhaparva*, and think how all the events can be squeezed into the short space of time comprised between 2nd January and the 8th March of the year 1431 B. C. Astronomically, according to the *Vedāṅga* calendar there should have been 61 days and not 65 days between the winter solstice and the *citrā Pūrṇamāsa*. The reader is referred to chapter XIX of my work, "*Ancient Indian chronology*", as to the date for initiation to Aśvamedha sacrifice, and also to page 32 for my finding of the date for the event.

Prof. Bhattacharyya's paper, "*The Date of the Bhārata War*" has been a total failure for the ruthless destruction, negation and misinterpretation of not less than six of the *Mahābhārata* statements for data as had been collected from the great epic by me. When he chooses the first and the last data only, he also makes a grave error of judgment. His obsession that I have been a staunch follower of the *Bhārata Sāvitri* is a piece of injustice done to me. His faith in a dubious statement and his other instances of illogical attitude of mind enumerated above, have dug very deep the grave of his thesis.

In these circumstances if he had also tried to find out the beginning of the *Mahābhārata Kaliyuga* at the junction of which and the *Dvāparayuga* the Bhārata war was fought

according to the *Mahābhārata*, I do not know what quagmire he would have weltered in. My date for the beginning of this Kali has been the 9th January, 2454 B. C. the combination of *Māghī Pūrṇimā* (full moon) and the Winter Solstice and that only five years before the year 2449 B.C. the date of my finding of the year of the Bhārata War.[7] I, for one, do not see how a *Kali*—beginning may be found about 1432-31 B. C. the year of Prof. Bhattacharyya's finding of the date of the Bhārata War.

As to this *Mahabhārata Kali*—beginning it must have happened on a Māghī full moon day falling on the Winter Solstice day. This month of *Māgha* must have also the following distinguishing peculiarities. It began with the new-moon at the beginning of the nakṣatra *Dhaniṣṭhā*, had the full-moon near the star *Regulus* or *Maghā* and the last quarter (Aṣṭakā) was conjoined with Jyeṣṭhā (*Antares*). About this *Māgha*, the reader is referred to my work, '*Ancient Indian Chronology*', when the winter solstice happened at the last quarter of this peculiar month of Māgha, the time was about 3000 B.C., when the full-moon day of this Māgha was the winter solstice day, the time was about 2454 B.C., when the Dhaniṣṭhā new moon day was the winter solstice, the time was about 1429 B.C. Even when this new moon ending *Māgha* could not give the winter solstice day, it is possible that the full-moon ending Māgha came into use, which had the Dhaniṣṭhā new moon at the middle. We have positive evidence to show that this peculiar month of Māgha was retained even up to 80 A.D. for the purpose of fixing the extra lunations, viz., the second Aṣaḍha and the second Pauṣa, also perhaps in calendar making. We know the well-known lines in Varāha's *Pañca Siddhantika*—

द्व्यूनं शकेन्द्रकालं पंचभिरुद्धृत्य शेषवर्षाणाम् ।

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[7] Vide my work, "*Ancient Indian Chronology*" pp. 40–43.

[8] Pp. 159—162.

द्विगुणं माघसिताद्यं कुर्याद् युगणं तदर्क्षचुदयात् ॥
.. ..
... . शशिभं धनिष्ठाद्यम् ॥

The epoch of the *Paitāmaha Siddhānta* is readily seen to be January 11, 80 A.D. mean sunrise at *Avantī* and on January 11, 80 A.D. of G.M.T., O hr. or Ujjayini mean-time 5 hrs. 4 mins., we have—

Apparent sun =289° 14′ 5″
,, Moon =289° 17′ 32″
β Delphinis =289° 39′ nearly.

This was clearly a Dhaniṣṭhā new moon and the beginning of the same peculiar month of lunar *Māgha*. Those who want to find the *Mahābhārata* Kali-beginning cannot lose sight of the facts stated in this paragraph

On the whole Prof. Bhattacharyya's paper has been a total failure in its attempt at finding the year of the Bhārata War.

In conclusion, I want to throw out some suggestions to the *Mahābhārata* scholars. My date for the Bhārata War has been 2449 B.C. or—2526 of the Śaka era. The event according to my finding belongs to the age of the Indus Valley civilization of old. As our *Mahābhārata* is real history and styled as *Jaya* or a tale of victory, the moot point here is to discover who these ancient Mohenzo Daro and Harappa people were according to the *Mahābhārata* and the *Ṛgveda*. They were most likely the Dānavas, the great builders, town and citadel makers with very good ideas as to the amenities of life. They are perhaps mentioned in the *Ṛgveda* as the Śiśnadevas who had also big cities with a hundred gates and their wealth was robbed by the worshippers of Indra. I invite the attention of all the great Indian Sanskritists who are specialists in their study of the *Mahābhārata* and the *Vedas* to this very important point. It is also well known that some of the Dānavas sided with Duryodhana in the Bhārata War.

Proceedings of the Annual General Meeting of the General Council of the Ganganatha Jha Research Institute, Allahabad

The Annual General Meeting of the General Council of the Ganganatha Jha Research Institute was held in the Institute Building on Friday, November 17, 1950 at 4.30 P. M. In the absence of the President—Dr. Bhagavan Das the Vice-President Dr. Amaranatha Jha took the chair.

The following members were present: Dr. Amaranatha Jha (in the chair), Dr. A. Siddiqi, Dr. Ishwari Prasad, Pt. K. Chattopadhyaya, Col. S. G. Tiwari, Shri A. C. Mukerji, Dr. B. R. Saksena, Shri S. C. Deb, Rai Ram Charan Agarwal, Shri Paramanand, Shri A. S. Nataraja Ayyar, Shri R. N. Kaul, Shir Zamin Ali, Pt. D. P. Shukla, and Dr. Umesha Mishra.

The minutes of the last meeting printed in the Journal Vol. VII. Parts 2-4 and circulated amongst the members were taken as read.

The chairman then called upon the Secretary Mm. Dr. Umesha Mishra to read out the Annual Report. The Report was read out and was adopted. The Council then took up the Estimated Budget and Statement of Accounts for 1951-52 presented by the treasurer as recommended by the Executive Committee for consideration and adopted it.

Next, the Council proceeded to elect the office bearers and members of the Executive Committee under Rule 17 for the period of three years Commencing from November 25, 1950.

The following were elected:—

Office bearers :

President—Dr. Bhagavan Das, Shanti Sadan, Sigra, Banaras Cantt.

Vice-Presidents :—(1) Dr. Sri S. Radhakrishnan and
(2) Col. Dr. Amaranath Jha.

Secretary—Mahamahopadhyaya Dr. Umesha Mishra

Treasurer—Dr. A. Siddiqi.

Members of the Executive Committee—

1. Prof. R. D. Ranade.
2. Dr. Ishwari Prasad.
3. Pt. K. Chattopadhyaya.
4. Pt. Gopal Swarup Pathak.
5. Rai Ram Charan Agarwala.
6 Shri S. C. Deb.

Hon'ble Shri K. M. Munshi had kindly agreed to address the Annual meeting but due to the pressure of his official work, he could not find it convenient to attend the function and address the meeting.

The Committee resolved to request the Account General U. P. to depute an officer of his office to audit the accounts of the Institute for 1950-51 as before.

There being no other business, the meeting was declared closed with thanks to the chair and the members.

UMESHA MISHRA
Secretary

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE GANGANATHA JHA RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR 1949-50

On behalf of the Executive Committee of the Ganganatha Jha Research Institute I present the Annual Report for the year ending March 31, 1950. During the year the most important work has been the construction of a wing of the Institute Building. It was on November 25, 1949 that the Institute was shifted to this new building from the Hindu Boarding House. After full six years we have been able to get some space to make separate arrangements for the manuscript section. The work of arranging and classifying manuscripts is very difficult and it requires a very large space for the purpose. For the present the big room on the first floor has been allotted to the manuscript section. Further construction can continue when more funds are available.

We have been trying to secure donations for the completion of the rest of the building and its equipment. But I am sorry to say that the response has been not at all hopeful. During the year the Uttara Pradesha Government has given us a non-recurring grant of Rs. 15,000 only and the Government of Orissa Rs. 1,000; and Rs. 730 have come from other sources. Thus the total amount of donations received during year was Rs. 16,730 only. For the construction of a portion of the building including a room for the servant and electric fitting the actual expenditure incurred is Rs. 36,003-8-6.

For the expansion of our activities we must complete the building and equip it with books, Journals and manuscripts It may be mentioned that the U. P. University Grants Committee visited the Institute and made recommendations

both for recurring and non-recurring grants to the Government, as a result of which the Government gave us for the year 1950-51 a recurring grant of Rs. 1,000/- and a non-recurring grant of Rs. 1,000/- only. While making these grants a note of appreciation of our work has been appended to the Budget for the year 1950-51 which I quote below :—

"Ganganatha Jha Research Institute, Allahabad has been doing very useful work for the last few years towards the preservation, fostering and encouragement of research ....It aims at having a fully equipped library consisting of books and Oriental Research Journals published in any language in the world and also at having a big collection of manuscripts. The Institute also issues a Quarterly Journal and plans to publish books and encourage research scholars for carrying on original investigation. Even at this stage of its infancy it has been attracting research students in Indology from all parts of India, as there are few Institutes of this kind in the country. A site for its building in Alfred Park, Allahabad was allotted and the building has been partially completed."

Government could not, however, provide more than Rs. 1,000/- recurring and Rs. 1,000/- non-recurring grant for the next year. Considering our activities and needs the above grant is very poor. We know how generously the Governments of Bombay and Madras give grants to the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona and the Kuppuswami Shastri Research Institute, Madras respectively. Besides, we have approached the Union Government in the Ministry of Education, but so far we have received no grant from them. It seems that without personal efforts by members who command influence no donations can be secured in the present condition of the country. I, therefore, take this opportunity to request our members who have interest in the work of the Institute to endeavour to enlist life-members and secure some research scholarships.

Membership

The total number of Ordinary Members of the Institute on the 31st of March 1950 was 84 like the previous year. Three had dropped but their place was filled up by new members. The number of life-members and also that of the Benefactors remained unchanged. So the total number of all the members of the Institute was 209.

Meetings

There were four meetings of the Executive Committee during the year and some business was transacted by correspondence also.

Publications

During the year we have published only two issues containing 219 pages. The Press which is printing the Journal seems to have been very much busy with other work, and the publication of the other numbers has been so much delayed.

As for the publication of the *Sanskrit Documents* which has been in the Press for more than four years now, I wish to express regret that the publication has been delayed longer than was necessary. The new Director of the National Archives of India who is the co-editor finds it difficult to make much progress in going through the proofs. However, I can only hope we shall be able to place the book in the hands of our members in course of the next few months for want of funds we have not undertaken any other publication.

Additions to the Library

During the course of this year we have received 60 books for review and they have been placed in the library. We have also purchased a few books for the use of our research scholar . The manuscript section has been much enriched;

we have spent about Rupees five hundred for purchasing select and rare manuscripts, particularly on Tantra. Three more foreign Journals have been added to the exchange list during the year. Thus the total number of Journals received in exchange up to the end of this year was 49.

Research Scholarship

After the term of Shri A. S. Nataraja Ayyar was over in last December the Executive Committee had decided to award a research scholarship of Rs. 150 per month for research in Buddhist Philosophy based on original Sanskrit Texts. But unfortunately for lack of funds we could not appoint any scholar till now.

Needs and suggestions

Our needs are manifold, specially because our Institute is in its infancy. (1) First of all we must try to complete the construction of the building without which the activities are very much hampered. (2) We should have closed shelves with glass panes for manuscripts. (3) The main aim of founding this Institute is to foster research work in original sources in Indology. For this we need research scholarships and highly qualified research scholars working in the Institute. (4) Equipment of the library with up to date publications of original texts and critical works on Indology in whatever language they are published. (5) We should try to have all the oriental journals either in exchange or by subscribing. (6) Lastly, collection of manuscripts which are scattered all over the country. It is known to all that the best treasures of our learning are concealed in these manuscripts. We know of several sciences which have not been unearthed so far. It is one of the most important duties of the State to collect these hidden treasures of our country. The owners of these manuscripts have no other interest now in them except some sentiment. Most of them are ready

to present them to any safe institution but they need some persuasion. But these must be collected even if we have to pay a price for them. Any delay in this may mean their disappearance or destruction.

There is another suggestion which I want to place before the members. We know that the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona has undertaken the work of publishing a critical edition of the *Mahābhārata* and later on, the *Purāṇas*. The Deccan College Post-graduate and Research Institute, Poona has taken up the work of publishing a *Dictionary of Sanskrit* on Historical Principles. The various states are helping them with generous donations. Similarly, I wish to suggest that this Institute should take up (1) the work of publihsing a critical bibliography of all the research work done in Indology so far. There is no publication to tell us as to what work has been done up to this time on any subject in any branch of oriental learning. This is not a new proposal. I had brought this proposal before the Executive Committee in 1945, and a Sub-committee with Dr. Tara Chand as its Convener was appointed to consider its financial implications. But nothing could be done for want of funds. (2) The second proposal is to pepare a chronology of Sanskrit works and their authors. It is pity that we have no idea of what contributions to Sanskrit literature have been made in any particular century or of the time of the authors.

Without these it is not possible to write any authentic history of Sanskrit literature on scientific lines. I, therefore, suggest that funds should be collected for the award of stipends for the above work and after some years we shall get an authentic history of Sanskrit literature written with the help of experts in different branches of Sanskrit learning. This entire scheme will take more than ten years. If a work like this is taken up by this Institute we shall have achieved a good deal.

With these few words I express my gratitude to all those who have helped the Institute in different capacities, namely, contributing articles to our Journal, presenting books, giving donations and so on. I am fully confident that they will continue their co-operation in future.

UMESHA MISHRA
Secretary

BALANCE SHEET FOR 1949-50

INCOME

	Rs.	a.	p
Annual Membership	1,145	6	0
Life Membership	700	0	0
Donations	16,730	0	0
Sale's Account	101	12	0
Interest Account	4,177	0	0
Refuud of last year's Advance	4,200	0	0
Total ...	27,054	2	0
O. B. ...	9,177	13	2
Grand total ...	36,231	15	2

EXPENDITURE

	Rs.	a.	p.
General Postage	42	2	9
Journal account	3,091	9	3
General Expenditure	2,437	12	6
Book binding Account	93	5	0
Cataloguing Account	40	0	0
Research Scholarship	1,130	0	0
Building Expenditure	23,635	14	9
Furniture	1,500	12	3
Security Deposit	180	0	0
Advances	3,523	0	0
Purchase of Manuscripts	419	3	0
Total ...	36,095	11	6
C. B. ...	136	3	8
Grand Total ...	36,231	15	2

LIABILITIES

	Rs.	a.	p
Due Expenditure	332	0	0
Surplus of Income over Expenditure as on 31-3-50	1,45,322	0	0
Total ...	1,45,654	0	0

ASSETS

	Rs.	a.	p.
Furniture	1,784	12	3
Manuscripts	1,000	3	0
Advances	3,523	0	0
Security Deposits	180	0	0
Security Invested	1,37,709	13	1
	(— 180	—	)
National Savings Certificates	1,560	0	0
Cash (Bank-hand)	136	3	8
Total ...	1,45,654	0	0

Sd. A. SIDDIQI,
Treasurer.

UMESHA MISHRA,
Secretary

Sd. GOPINATH
Anditor.,

FINANCIAL ESTIMATE FOR 1950-51

EXPENDITURE—RECURRING :

No.	Item	Rs.
1.	Curator and Librarian at Rs. 150/- p.m. ...	1,800
2.	Part time Pandit Working in the manuscript section at Rs. 45/- p.m.	540
3.	Clerk and Typist at Rs. 100/- p.m.	1,200
4.	Two Research scholarships at Rs. 150/- p.m. each ...	3,600
5.	Publication of the Research Journal	5,000
6.	Publication of Rare and important books ...	5,000
7.	Purchase of Printed books	1,500
8.	Purchase of Mss.	1,000
9.	Library attendent at Rs. 40/- p.m.	480
10.	Binding of books and journals	300
11.	Cloth for Manuscript binding	100
12.	Postage	150
13.	Chowkidar at Rs. 35/- p. m. including D. A. ...	420
14.	Mali at Rs. 40/- p. m. including D A. ...	480
15.	Peon at Rs. 35/- p m. including D A. ...	420
16.	Sweeper at Rs. 35/- p. m. including D. A. ...	420
17.	Contingencies	100
	Total ...	22,510
	NON-RECURRING :	
1.	Building and its equipment...	1,00,000
	Grand Total = ...	1,22,510
	(One lac twenty two thousand five-hundred and ten Rupees only.)	
	Expenditure over and above the Income = ...	35,910

INCOME—RECURRING :

No.	Item	Rs.
1.	Annual Membership Subscription	1,000
2.	Interest on Securities	3,500
3.	Annual Grant from Orissa Govt.	1,000
	Total = ...	5,500
	NON-RECURRING :	
1.	Donations	20,000
2.	Grants from Governments	10,000
3.	Grants from Government for building and its equipment	50,000
4.	Subscription from Life Membership	600
5.	Proceeds from sale of Journals and books	500
	Total = ...	81,100
	Grand Total = ...	86,600

Sd. A. SIDDIQI
Treasurer

UMESHA MISHRA
Secretary

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

THE SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN ANCIENT INDIA. By Dr. K. L. Daftari B.A., B.L., D.Litt. (Hony,) Published by Nagpur University. Pages xv+182. Price Rs. 3/- 1947.

The book under review consists of ten Lectures delivered by Dr. Daftari under the auspices of the Nagpur University as the 1st Lecture in the '*Mahadeo Hari Wathodkar Memorial Lecturership*' Series. The subject chosen by the lecturer is indeed very important and interesting. The lecturer claims to have made a deep and unprejudiced study of the entire Sanskrit literature from Veda down to the Folk literature of the country with a clear understanding of the spirit of Indian thought. He himself says in the very beginning of his first lecture, "The Social Institutions of the Ancient Indians" deserve to be studied more deeply and throughly than have been done hitherto, especially if we have to take from the study of the past any lesson for our future progress."

The topics of the ten lectures are—(1) Subject, sources of Information, (2) Preliminary Information, (3) The Varṇas, (4) Manus and Saptarshis, (5) Āśramas, (6) The Yajña and the Aśvamedha Yajña, (7) Marriage and (8) The picture of the Ancient Society.

No doubt, the topics of lectures are very attractive and the lecturer has promised to present the views of our Śāstras without any prejudices. But when we study his book we are very much disappointed. The book indeed contains many surprising interpretations with which no scholar can agree. I refer only to same of these interpretations of Dr. Daftari here.

1. While speaking of the मानसिकसृष्टि Dr. Daftari says—"This is an impossibility. The realistic interpretation is to regard this creation as nomination, election, adoption or appointment to an office. If we thus interpret the Purānas in a realistic manner, they will be found to convey to us abundant information about the Social and Political Institutions of Ancient Indians." In support of this *fantastic* interpretation of his own Dr. Daftari further says "There are several words in the Purānas that have got more than one meaning. Some of these meanings, that would give the realistic construction, have been lost through operation of time and the meaning that is known to these learned men, can give only a fantastic construction." (p. 11).

2. On pages 16—23, Dr. Daftari says, while dealing with the 14 lokas, that *lokas* are not *places* but "must be assemblies exercising public functions. Moreover these are said to have been created by words only and words cannot create cities but can create assemblies."

3. Again, while interpreting the lines of वायुपुराण—

अग्न्यादि देवपत्न्यन्तं देवताकाण्डमुच्यते ।
अग्न्यादि देवी ऊर्जाहुत्यन्तः क्षितिगतोगणः ॥
वाय्वादयो भगान्ताः स्युः अन्तरिक्षस्थदेवताः ।
सूर्यादि देवपत्न्यन्ताः द्युस्थानदेवता इति ॥

Dr. Daftari says that the names beginning with अग्नि and ending in देवपत्न्यः are पदानि according to निघण्टु and as such these "are the names of offices in human Society."

4. Next, while explaning the meaning of मन्वन्तर Dr. Daftari says—it is "going from one Varṇa into another and of entering into the Society consisting of the four Varnas."

From the above interpretations of Dr. Daftari it is clear that they are all fantastic and cannot be at all accepted by any sensible man. How can one consciously believe that the भूलोक in which we live is not a place to live but an assembly exercising public function; that creation is a nomi-

nation, election, adoption or appointment to an office. that अग्नि is not the name of a God but an office in human society.

Such interpretations of Hindu Śāstra are not at all desirable. There should be some consistency, truth corborrated with actual facts of experience and sense in new interpretations. They should be supported by some authority. Mere speculations based on fantastic thoughts cannot give us the proper meaning. It is our duty to read such peculiar views and try to correct them, so that our Ancient thoughts may not be misunderstood and mislead people. Such views should not be encouraged.

SAMSKARAS.—The Genius Behind Sacramental Rites. By Sri Hamsa Yogi. Published by the Suddha Dharma office, Mylapore, Madras 4 in the Suddha Dharma Tract series No 9. pages viii+57+36+9 1951. Price Inland Rs. 2-8-0, Foreign Dol. 1.25 or sh. 8.

Sri Haṁsa Yogī is the accredited teacher of the *Suddha Dharma Mandalam*. He gave a talk on Saṁskāras and their significances to his followers, which appeared in the fourth Patalam of the *Sānatana Dharma-dīpikā* Vol. II in 1180 Sanskrit Ślokas. An English translation of these Ślokas appeared in the *Śuddha Dharma* which is now presented in a book form.

The editor of the *Śuddha Dharma* has rightly observed that faith in Samskāras is gradually disappearing not merely because of the influence of the time but also on account of our not knowing the true significances of these rites. The book under review is an attempt to remove such ignorance and also to strengthen the faith of those who even now believe in them.

The Yogin has no doubt followed the views of the ancient thinkers, but has also introduced here and there a good

F 15

deal of his own original interpretation. For instance, in Garbhādhāna Saṁskāra he distinguishes between Arṣa, Mānuṣa and Daivarṣa types. Similarly, he makes three sub-divisions of each of the four kinds of marriage, namely, Prākṛta, Ātmīya and Śuddha. Thus he holds that in all there are twelve kinds of marriage.

The book is quite good and helpful to understand the spirit underlying these Saṁskāras.

ASANAS, Part One; by Shri Kuvalayananda : published in the Popular Yoga series, Volume one. Yoga-Mimaṁsa office, Kaivalyadhāma, Lonavala (G. I. P.), pages 18+188. 1949, Price Rs. 7/- (Third Impression).

PRĀṆĀYĀMA, Part one. By Shri Kuvalayananda. Published in the Popular Yoga series, Vol. 2. Kaivalyadhāma Lonovala (G. I. P.). Third Impression. 1950. Pages 18+160. Price Rs. 5-8 only.

It is known to all lovers of Yogic practices that Lonavala is a great centre of Yogic Physical Culture of India. It has served the right cause of Indian culture and has helped many a needy persons to regain their proper health through Yogic practices. It has taught people the practical value of Yoga-śāstra in our life.

The book under review is the first volume of the popular yoga series. It gives detailed description of the technique of nearly every Āsana that has a physical or a spiritual value. Each Āsana has been fully illustrated and this has added to the worth of the book. The treatment is not confined to the Āsanas alone but it also covers practices like Viparita Karaṇī, Yoga Mudra, Uḍḍiyāna and Naulī.

The book is divided into six chapters : Human Body, preparing oneself for Āsanas, Meditative poses, cultural poses, Four Additional Exercises, and Scientific Survey of

Yogic poses. Besides there are three appendices dealing with the instructions to be followed for practising these Asanas. At the end it has a short Glossary of important words. There are 81 illustrations.

The treatment is throughout very scientific and easy to be followed. In fact, the book is a practical guide for understanding the significance and the method of practising Āsanas. Āsana is a sort of physical exercise and it also helps in bringing manas under control. For the achievement of the highest goal of life control over body and manas is very essential. It is with this idea that the book has been written based on personal experience. The book is very useful for every one who desires physical and mental peace.

The next step towords the realisation of the highest aim of our life, religion and philosophy is the practising of Prāṇāyāma. Both Āsana and Prāṇāyāma are very closely connected. Āsana helps in the proper performance of Prāṇāyāma. Without proper Āsana one cannot proceed successfully with Prāṇāyāma. Thus the effort of Kaivalyadhāma in presenting the second book, in the popular yoga series, on Prāṇāyāma is very significant.

The book under review has been based on the study of our ancient texts on yoga in their proper spirit. Yoga is a practical science and unless a Yogic teacher has good experience of yogic exercises, his teachings can have no value. There are enough proofs in the book to show the deep study of the original sources by the author. The treatment is Scientic, lucid and interesting.

All the statements in the book have been very clearly illustrated which has made the book much more useful.

Though these books are very critically written and have been properly illustrated yet it is desirable that aspirants for a through knowledge in the science should always consult one who has direct experience in the science.

We heartly congratulate the author and the authorities of Kaivalyadhama for these popular hand books on Yoga. We hope we shall have many more similar books on this important science.

HINDU SAMSKĀRAS.—A socio-religious study of the Hindu Sacraments, by Shri Raj Bali Pandey, M.A., D.Litt., Professor of Ancient Indian History and Culture, Banares Hindu University. Published by Vikrama publications, Bhadaini, Banaras, 1949, pages xiii+546, price Rs. 25.

The book under review is an approved thesis for the degree of Doctor of Letters by the Banaras Hindu University in 1936. It consists of ten chapters: The sources of Inquiry, the meaning and the number of the Saṁskāras, the purposes of the Saṁskāras, the constituents of the Saṁskāras, the Prenatal Saṁskāras, the Saṁskāras of childhood, the Educational Saṁskāras, Vivāha, and the Antyeṣṭi Saṁskāras and Conclusion.

Each of these chapters has been divided into various sections according to the nature and importance of the details constituting the topic discussed in the chapter. The treatment of Saṁskāras is a very important subject. It gives us a clear vision of the background of culture of India. In fact, it is the very basis upon which the entire structure of Hinduism rests. A comprehensive study of this subject was a great desideratum and it is a matter of great pleasure to me to welcome this book.

The treatment of the topics in the book is based on authoritative texts and has been very lucid. It discusses almost all the aspects of the subject dispassionately. The book contains a good deal of information and is very useful for all lovers of Indian Culture. The author has taken great

care to make the book quite exhaustive and has utilised all possible matter available, but one feels, on careful reading, that there is still much scope for its improvement. Comparative merits of various authorities have to be closely discussed in order to bring the discussions in tune with our life. However, all this can be easily done in the subsequent edition.

It pains me to remark that the printing and editing of the book have not been as the book deserves. It would have been much better if the book could be had for a lower price in order that it may be read with benefit by a large number of men. I congratulate both the author and the publisher of the book for this valuable piece of work presented to the scholarly world.

Music and Dance in Kālidāsa by K. V. Ramchandran, Asram Crossent Road, Coinbatore, pp. 31; Re. 1.

The present booklet, which is the reprint if a long paper printed in the Journal of Oriental Research, Madras, seeks to examine Kālidāsa's dramatic art from an aspect which has not so far received much of critical attention. Music and dance had both reached a high measure of excellence in ancient India, and Shri Ramchandran tries to make out that Kālidāsa had sueh considerable acquaintance with the various *rāgas* and *rāgiṇīs* of India that he had employed them at some of the most suitable moments in his plays and poems. These *rāgas* and *rāgiṇīs* lend atmosphere and verve to the plays wherein they occur and Kālidāsa, according to Shri Ramchandran, had a wide knowledge of them.

But this conclusion is at best inferential and not as revealing and decisive as the one Shri Ramchandran had arrived at with reference to Kālidāsa's treatment of the dance. Here in the second part of his pamphlet the author is more critical, and the way he has scrutinised the dance

gestures in the *Śākuntalaṁ* with reference to the *Naṭyaśastra* would surely be helpful towards a better staging of some of Kālidāsa's plays. The *nāṭya* directions of *Rāghavabhaṭṭa* in this regard are quite interesting and the way he had indicated some of the most intricate as well as delicate of the dramatic gestures in the *Śākuntalaṁ*, go to show that Kālidāsa had a high sense of the stage. A comparison with the western techniques of the use of song and dance in drama is sure to yield remarkable results and Shri Ramchandran can well undertake the task. His small pamphlet shows that he is fit to do it.

—Dr. Amar Mukerji
